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Abstract
At a time when technology companies are talking about «silent speech interfaces», it 
is particularly important, I believe, to look back at what the medievals said about «in-
ternal discourse» and the significatory power of concepts. In this vein, then, as much 
as being an «art of conversion» via dialectical argumentation and a means whereby 
to unite all branches of knowledge under a set of ultimate principles, Ramon Llull’s 
Art is an «art of contemplation», born of prayer and internal discourse at the highest 
levels of intellect, not least in the first phase thereof (i. e. before 1290). His Art is, 
therefore, the technological interface whereby internal discourse can be encoded and 
transmitted. By examining potential antecedents (including Aristotle, St Anselm, St 
Augustine, Boethius, Hugh of St Victor, St Irenaeus of Lyon, St John of Damascus, St 
Maximus the Confessor, Peter of Spain, Priscian, St Thomas Aquinas and William of 
Sherwood), as well as consequents (such as William of Ockham and Erasmus of Rot-
terdam), I attempt to construct a literary topography wherein to situate the statements 
made by Llull on the topic of internal discourse and whereby to understand how the 
latter, in its pre-eminent angelic form, helped to shape his thinking about the superio-
rity of thought over the spoken and written word, a position which might suggest the 
presence of conceptualist elements within the realism for which he is well-known.
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Resum
En una època en què les companyies tecnològiques parlen d’«interfícies de parla si-
lent» penso que és especialment important mirar cap enrere i recuperar el que deien 
els medievals a propòsit del «discurs interior» i del poder significatiu dels conceptes. 
En aquesta línia, l’Art de Ramon Llull, sense deixar de ser «art de conversió» basada 
en l’argumentació dialèctica i una eina per unir totes les branques del saber en un de 
principis fonamentals, és una «art de contemplació», nascuda de la pregària i del dis-
curs interior als nivells més elevats de l’intel·lecte, com a mínim en la seva primera 
fase (i. e. abans de 1290). L’Art és, en aquest sentit, la interfície tecnològica que per-
met de codificar i transmetre el discurs interior. A través del repàs dels possibles pre-
cedents (incloent-hi Aristòtil, sant Anselm, sant Augustí, Boeci, Hugh de Sant Víctor, 
Ireneu de Lió, sant Joan Damascè, sant Màxim el Confessor, Pere Hispà, Priscià, sant 
Tomàs d’Aquino i Guillem de Sherwood), i també dels continuadors (com ara Guilem 
d’Ockham i Erasme de Rotterdam), intento de construir una topografia literària per tal 
de situar les afirmacions de Llull sobre el motiu del discurs interior i de copsar com 
aquest, en la seva preeminent forma angèlica, va contribuir a afaiçonar la seva con-
vicció de la superioritat del pensament amb relació a la paraula parlada i escrita, una 
posició que podria suggerir la presència d’elements conceptualistes dins del realisme 
que se li sol reconèixer. 
Paraules clau
Discurs interior, pregària, veritat, verbum cordis, oratio, cogitatio, logos endiathetos 
i prophorikos
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1. Introduction1
I should like to begin by considering the broad hermeneutical framework 
offered by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his Wahrheit und Methode, a work whe-
rein he views the relationship between words, things and thoughts through the 
prism of a fundamental contrast between language and logos (as conceived by 
Greek philosophy under the influence largely of Plato’s Cratylus and, in lesser 
part, the Sophist, both of which texts, however, were unavailable to medieval 
thinkers)2 and Patristic and Scholastic—that is to say, specifically Christian—
understandings of language vis-à-vis the concept of verbum.3 According to 
this author’s account, words, for the early Greek philosophers, constituted no 
more than names and thereby failed to represent true being; instead, they were 
conceived as substitutes for things.4
Plato’s Cratylus, in Gadamer’s view, holds that words and things corres-
pond to each other either: a) conventionally through unambiguous usage sanc-
tioned by agreement and practise, by which convention is assigned the sole 
source of a word’s meaning;5 or b) by the natural agreement (or resemblance) 
1  I should like to thank the Institut Ramon Llull (IRL) for providing financial assistance enabling me 
to present an earlier version of this article at Magdalen College, Oxford as part of the “Llull Year” (l’Any 
Llull) colloquium, “Celebrating Ramon Llull in Oxford”, co-organized by the IRL and Dr Juan-Carlos 
Conde of the Magdalen Iberian Medieval Studies Seminar (MIMSS) on 25th November 2016. I should also 
like to thank Dr Celia López Alcalde for providing me with a number of Lullian texts otherwise unavail-
able to me, and to thank Drs Josep Enric Rubio and Alexander Fidora for reading an earlier draft or drafts 
of this article. Both of the latter also alerted me to the existence of material not known to me, for which I 
am grateful. Josep Rubio’s comments have been very helpful, and although I argue against certain of his 
points in the interests of maintaining consistency as to the lines of argument pursued in this article, I have 
found his considered opinion altogether very persuasive. The reader should also note that I only received a 
copy of Rubio (2017a) on the very day of the final submission of this article. All translations are my own 
unless otherwise stated. Unfortunately, I have not had access to St Thomas Aquinas’s Expositio libri Pery-
ermenias. Editio altera retractata, R.-A. Gauthier (ed.), Rome/Paris, Commissio Leonina: J. Vrin, 1989, 
and again for the sake of consistency, quote from Roberto Busa’s edition of St Thomas’s works. Despite 
repeated attempts in British research libraries, I was also unable to access a copy of the CCCM edition of 
St Augustine’s De trinitate.
2 Until the twelfth century the only work of Plato’s to be transmitted to the Latin west was a version 
by Cicero (106 BC-43 BC) of the Timaeus and a later translation of the first part thereof (i.e. as far as 53c) 
by Calcidius (fl. 4th century). There were also translations of the Phaedo and Meno by Henry Aristippus of 
Catania (1105/1110-1162), although these were little read, as well as of sections of the Parmenides. In the 
thirteenth century William of Moerbeke translated the Neoplatonist Proclus’s (412-485 AD) commentary 
on the Parmenides into Latin, a translation which was widely read during the Middle Ages. For Proclus’s 
commentary, see ‘Conclusion’.
3  Gadamer (2004, 406-426). I owe this reference to one of the anonymous referees of this article.
4  Ibid., 406.
5  Ibid., 406-407.
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between a word and a thing as characterised by its ‘correctness’.6 These two 
theories, though not mutually exclusive, were limited, in Gadamer’s view, by 
their reliance upon notions of the ‘existence and instrumentality of words’.7 The 
Cratylus, again in Gadamer’s view, seeks to deny to language the ability to ac-
cess truth in favour of a theory of the direct apprehension of a thing from itself, 
wordlessly.8 In this way, the true object of thought becomes the realm of ideas.9
In this context, logos (or the soul’s discourse with itself; also ‘speech’) 
can be either true or false, such truth or falsity seemingly being dependent on 
correct or incorrect usage.10 Unlike in ancient times, therefore, when the unity 
of word and thing was beyond doubt, and a word was equivalent to a name, 
a true name forming part of the bearer’s name itself,11 for Plato, logos per se, 
which flowed from thought, was the bearer of truth (or error).12
From Gadamer’s counter-Enlightenment perspective, then, language as 
conceived by the Greek philosophers possessed merely the secondary instru-
mentality of the sign, instrumentality whereby any being attributable to the 
former fell under the dominion of thought.13 For Gadamer, however, the Chris-
tian mystery of the Incarnation represents a radical reversal of such reduction 
of language to ideality as achieved by the Greek concept of logos. Through its 
emphasis upon the relationship between human speech and thought and the 
centrality thereof to Trinitarian theology, medieval thinking on the Incarnati-
on, for Gadamer, represents the full realisation of spirit via the enfleshment, 
though not embodiment, of the Word, and the freeing of logos from the realms 
of spirituality/ideality.14
Gadamer considers the analogical reflection of the intra-Trinitarian relati-
on of Filiation in those of thought/word and logos endiathetos/logos propho-
rikos, as developed by the Church Fathers, to have performed a crucial role in 
6  Ibid., 407.
7  Id. The general lines of Gadamer’s argument stress that language and language usage (e.g. speech, 
‘inner’ or ‘outer’) should be considered as an ‘event’ rather than as a ‘tool’.
8  Id.
9  Id.
10  Ibid., 412.
11  Ibid., 406.
12  Ibid., 412.
13  Ibid., 414-417.
14  Ibid., 418.
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situating ‘the problem of language [...] entirely within inner thought’.15 In this 
respect, certain works of Augustine (discussed below) play a major part, inso-
far as, in Gadamer’s eyes, his notion of a verbum cordis (or true word) is com-
pletely independent of such a verbum’s sensory appearance within any given 
language; it is, in fact, the image or mirror of the divine Word.16 Nonetheless, 
although this Augustinian concept effectively undermines the role of the pro-
liferation of languages and the value of outward speech, these latter are not 
omitted from discussion completely.17 Gadamer further highlights the impor-
tance of Augustine’s particular elucidation of the mystery of the Trinity, whe-
reby the verbum as inner word is closely related to ‘reason’ (intellectus), and 
a correspondence is brought out between the relationship of human thought 
to speech and intra-Trinitarian relationships themselves (circumincessio).18 In 
these latter respects, then, the ‘inner word’, for Augustine, represents more 
than simply the soul’s discourse with itself.19
Gadamer goes on to interpret the thinking of High Scholasticism with re-
gard to the word as a form of reversion to the classical concept of the logos, 
under the influence of Aristotelianism.20 He sees Thomas Aquinas as failing 
to give a proper account of the range of languages, though concedes that St 
Thomas does not go as far as completely to equate logos and verbum.21 For 
Aquinas, the inner word is defined by its relation to possible utterance, and 
within the intellect has an ordinatio ad alterum, and consists in its subject mat-
ter being thoroughly thought through (forma excogitata) via inquiry (inquisi-
tio) and ‘thoughtfulness’ (cogitatio), the latter of which is a term common in 
Ramon Llull’s works, as discussed below.22
It is also to be noted that three of the terms used in the title of this article, 
namely, oratio, verbum and sermo constitute renderings considered synony-
mous with the Greek term logos, as found in the Septuagint, within the Latin 
15  Ibid., 419. For these aspects, see below §§ 2 (text at nn. 63-65 and 83) and 3.1.
16  Ibid., 420. For the works of St Augustine relevant in this respect, see below §§ 2 (after nn. 65, 71, 
85) and 2.1 (at n. 120).
17  Ibid., 419-420. For Ramon Llull’s consideration of the multiplicity of tongues in the context of both 
‘internal discourse’ and outward mission, see below, end of § 2.2.
18  For discussion of St Augustine’s De trinitate etc., see above, n. 16, and below, § 2.2 (at n. 139).
19  Ibid., 420-421.
20  Ibid., 421.
21  Id.
22  Id. In the conclusion to this article I shall be both situating Ramon Llull’s writings within the con-
text of Gadamer’s thesis and calling into question some of the claims made therein.
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Vulgate Bible. (The same Greek term was likewise often rendered into Latin 
by translators as ratio or argumentum, conveying the sense of ‘argument’ or 
‘line of reasoning’.)23 In this context and others, they convey in English the 
various senses of “speech”, “the word”, “discourse” and “conversation”, and 
even “language” and “disputation”, among other such. The correctness of the 
Vulgate’s choices as regards the Latin translation of the Greek term, partic-
ularly with reference to John 1:1, however, would eventually become, at the 
height of Humanist inquiry, the subject of a celebrated controversy, as is man-
ifested by the two versions of Erasmus of Rotterdam’s Apologia de In prin-
cipio erat sermo, both of which versions (A and B) first appeared in 1520 in 
defence of his use of the variant sermo for verbum in the second edition of his 
New Testament of 1519.24 “Les paraules de sa pensa”, on the other hand, is the 
turn of phrase Ramon Llull most commonly uses to denote human “internal 
discourse” or thought and provides a possible direct correlate for and transla-
tion of the scholastic term verbum mentis, used to signify ideas or concepts.
In this article, however, I should like to argue that, in at least the early 
formulations (or “Ternary Phase”) of his Art, namely, between 1271/1272 and 
1290, Ramon Llull formalises the pre-linguistic principles and conditions dis-
covered in and through thought, consideration, cogitation, prayer and con-
templation, that is to say, “internal discourse”.25 He ensures, in turn, I believe, 
that these principles and conditions themselves come to form the basis of all 
discourse, whether internal or external. By doing so, Llull was, in part, respon-
ding to the Aristotelian stratagem of basing demonstration upon logic, namely, 
“internal discourse” par excellence, though also to the Augustinian notion of 
“knowledge accompanied by love” (cum amore notitia).26
Thus, if the principles and conditions of Llull’s Art were to occupy a simi-
lar status in relation to his system of thought as did syllogistic logic in relation 
to that of Aristotle, they too could found an art of demonstration, and thereby 
23  Ammonius (1961, lxxx).
24  Erasmus (1706).
25  The sixth-century Latin grammarian Priscian was instrumental in introducing to the Middle Ages 
the notion that vox (vocal sound or the spoken word) indicated a mentis conceptum (or mental concept), 
which he also called cogitatio; cf. Cassin et al. (2014, 165). In the context of the logical and semantic 
dimensions of Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics of substance, however, vox significativa or meaningful vocal 
sound has a significatio which “supposits for” (i. e. stands for) its significatum (i. e. the thing meant); cf. 
Murè (2013, 209). As Rubio trenchantly affirms, in Llull’s writings, prayer and contemplation are coinci-
dent concepts and practices, in Rubio (2017a, 109-112).
26  Augustine (1997a, 102), De trinitate, IX, 10, 15.
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produce causal knowledge, as well as an art of loving God, neighbour and 
self. In arguing thus, I seek to establish the continuity and interpenetration 
between the contemplative and demonstrative aspects of Llull’s writings, as 
also between knowledge and love, and thought and language therein.
In the latter respect, this continuity only comes into being, I would suggest, 
as a result of his efforts to overcome what he perceives to be a fundamental 
epistemic and ontological gap between “internal” and “external discourse”, 
to which end, some six years after 1290, Llull would formulate his theory 
of affatus or oral communication, as a sixth sense, in contrast to Aristotle’s 
categorical denial in his De anima of the existence of such. Aristotle, in fact, 
clearly states (in translation) that “there is no [sixth] sense in addition to the 
five [enumerated]—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch”.27
In the medieval period, the standard criterion for distinguishing between 
internal and external discourse was to be found in such a discourse’s ordinatio 
ad alterum, that is to say, its being addressed to another.28 Oratio (as outward 
speech) was traditionally so distinguished, however, only secundum rationem, or 
according to reason, rather than to reality.29 This meant that a concept was equiva-
27  Aristotle (1995a, 675), De anima, III, 1, 424b22: “Non existere ullum alium sensum praeter istos 
quinque (loquor de visu, auditu, odoratu, gustu, tactu) potest ex considerationibus, quae sequuntur, de-
duci [...]”, in Aristotle (1957, 215). There is an extensive literature on Llull’s affatus, with which, for the 
purposes of this article, I will assume the reader is familiar. This literature includes (to mention but a few 
examples) Dagenais (1983, 107-121); Johnston (1990a, 3-30, 139-159); Johnston (1990b, 39-44); Pistolesi 
(1996, 3-45); and Pistolesi (1998, 73-92). Rubio summarises and, to an extent, supersedes the foregoing 
references in Rubio (2017a, 45-51).
28  We should also note, however, that in De fallaciis, Prologue, a work possibly by Thomas Aquinas, 
the very same criterion is used to distinguish argumentatio plain and simple from disputatio: “Sed ratioci-
natio quae est ad alterum, non solum est syllogismus vel argumentatio, sed disputatio”, in Aquinas (1980a, 
575). In his discussions on the nature of verbum, Aquinas does, in fact, note the distinction in respect of 
internal and external discourse in another work of greater importance, namely, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 co., 
where he states: “Sed tamen sciendum est, quod in operationibus intellectus est quidam gradus. Primo enim 
est simplex intuitus intellectus in cognitione intelligibilis, et hoc nondum habet rationem verbi. Secundo 
est ibi ordinatio illius intelligibilis ad manifestationem vel alterius, secundum quod aliquis alteri loquitur, 
vel sui ipsius, secundum quod contingit aliquem etiam sibi ipsi loqui, et haec primo accipit rationem verbi; 
unde verbum nihil aliud dicit quam quamdam emanationem ab intellectu per modum manifestantis”, in 
Aquinas (1980b, 74). At this point in his text, Aquinas distinguishes between four levels of verbum: 1) 
simple intuition in intelligible cognition; 2) verbum cordis; 3) verbum interius quod habet imaginationem 
vocis; and 4) verbum vocis itself. For the latter information, cf. Rosier-Catach (2009, 77). In ‘De verbo’, 
q. 4, art. 1, resp., of his Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, very probably a private disputation conducted 
as a young Master at the University of Paris between 1256-1259, Thomas distinguishes simply between: 1) 
verbum cordis; 2) verbum exemplar exterioris vocis (= verbum interius quod habet imaginationem vocis); 
and 3) verbum vocis (= verbum exterius expressum), for which see Aquinas (1992, 30).
29  The terms oratio (in Latin) and oració (in Catalan) convey in their respective languages at least the 
three following senses: discourse or speech; sentence or clause expressing a complete sense; and prayer. In 
the course of this article, I shall be calling on all three of these senses.
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lent in function to a sign, and thus may have been suggestive to Llull of the pos-
sibility of a purely intellectual, though outwardly significative, form of “internal 
discourse”, wherein thoughts themselves, rather than terms, had the capacity for 
reference.30 Another term which was common among Latin authors to indicate 
speech or discourse is sermo, related as this is to the medieval ars sermocina-
lis whereby logic or dialectic is viewed as the art of discourse or argumenta-
tion. From the very earliest point in his production, namely the Compendium 
logicae Algazelis (1271-1272 ?), translated into Catalan verse as the Lògica 
del Gatzell, Ramon Llull makes use of the term sermo (or sermó in Catalan) to 
denote the broadest category of statements of which logical propositions form 
part and which are subject to a criterion of truth and falsity.31
I should further like to argue that the traditional medieval equation of 
knowledge with contemplation,32 combined with St Augustine’s own equa-
tion of knowledge, that is to say, man’s entire knowledge, both contempla-
tive and active, with truth, might have suggested to Llull that contemplation 
itself could be equated with truth, and that the discovery of truth was an art, 
indeed an art of contemplation itself.33 The foregoing has explanatory force 
throughout Llull’s writing career, given that between 1273-1274 and 1313 he 
composed a variety of works (or parts thereof) either bearing in their title the 
term contemplation or concerning that very topic.34
For Ramon Llull, things, thoughts, (written or spoken) words and, parti-
cularly, actions which are concordant with the divine attributes—attributes 
which themselves serve as the principles of his onto-theo-logical system and 
30  For further discussion of the senses attributed to the term oratio by both Priscian and the medieval 
logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, cf. below, § 2, this article, and notes, esp. nn. 51 and 52. 
For the relation of St Thomas Aquinas to the logica moderna represented by the writings of, not least, the 
two latter authors and for the passage from theories of signification via theories of supposition to Aquinas’s 
own theory equating signs with concepts, cf. Gaukroger (1978, 137-138).
31  Lohr (1967, 93-130); this text contains an edition of Llull’s Compendium logicae Algazelis; ORL 
XIX, 1-62. The term sermó occurs 21 times in the course of the Catalan version of the text.
32  Cf. Koch (2009, 1).
33  Augustine (1997a, 464), De trinitate XV, 10, 17; and PL 42:1069-1070, here 1070: “Nunc ergo 
simul de universa scientia hominis loquimur, in qua nobis nota sunt quaecumque sunt nota: quae utique 
vera sunt, alioquin nota non essent. Nemo enim falsa novit, nisi cum falsa esse novit: quod si novit, verum 
novit; verum est enim quod illa falsa sint.”
34  Llibre de contemplació en Déu (1273-1274 ?); Oracions e contemplacions de l’enteniment (1274-
1276 ?); “Art de contemplació” (Montpellier, 1276-1283 ?), ch. 101 of the Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna; 
De contemplatione Raymundi (Paris, Aug 1297), containing parts entitled “Quomodo possumus Deum 
contemplari” (= “De decem modis contemplandi Deum”) and “Quomodo contemplatio transit in raptum” 
(= “De raptu”) among others; and Liber de compendiosa contemplatione (Messina, May 1313).
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are governed therein by certain conditions—are considered exemplary, whi-
le those which are contrary thereto are considered anathema. We should not 
forget either that the Lullian project as outlined above, grounded in thought 
and contemplation, as it is, also requires of itself that it be communicable, 
communicable, that is, on a universal scale.
Anthropologically speaking, for Llull, man, the noblest of creatures, is an 
ambiguous and ambivalent figure, ambiguous externally and semiotically and 
ambivalent internally, that is to say, ontologically and morally. Such ambi-
guity and ambivalence requires order if it is to be resolved, and such order 
derives from Llull’s God-focused doctrine of intentions. According to this 
doctrine, man’s “first intention”, as Llull calls it, namely, his ultimate purpose, 
is to know, love, honour, serve and praise God, while his “second intention” 
consists in any means which contributes to the attainment of that end.35 Man’s 
constitution as both a sensible and an intellectual being, however, does not 
necessarily result in a dichotomy, as these aspects of his nature are mediated 
by his imaginative faculty as well as by his five “spiritual senses”, which exist 
in addition to the three mental powers of the soul (i. e. memory intellect and 
will), and include, in Llull’s listing: subtlety, cogitation, apperception, consci-
ence and courage (or fervour).36
These “spiritual senses”, possessing apprehensive functions, have their 
roots in a number of traditions which Llull merges to create something novel. 
They are not simply based, therefore, on those of Avicenna, who, in his De 
anima, identified five internal senses, namely, the sensus communis, imag-
ination, cogitation, estimation and memory, though Avicenna does, in fact, 
feature among the writers upon whom Llull drew.37 Moreover, as Llull states 
35  Cf., most recently, Ruiz Simon (2002).
36  Only in the very final stages of preparing this article, have I discovered that Amador Vega has pre-
viously written at some length on the role of the imagination in Llull’s theory of “contemplative prayer”, 
cf. Vega (2005, 157-178). There is some overlap in our concerns, though our focus and emphasis differ. 
Vega’s article stresses the crucial role played by the imagination in the ascent from sensible to intellectual 
signification in Llull, and he points to the importance of the four modes of such signification from which 
what Llull calls a “secret” emerges, modes Llull sets out in the Compendium logicae Algazelis/Lògica del 
Gatzell as follows: sensible → sensible, sensible → intellectual, intellectual → intellectual, intellectual → 
sensible, the latter, through its descent, completing the circle, in what Llull calls a return from the theoreti-
cal to the practical; cf. ORL XIX, 29-30. In this article, it is the third such level which attracts the majority 
of my attention, a level at which the five “spiritual senses” come into play.
37  For a fuller account of eclectic sources underlying Llull’s recourse to the Arabic-Peripatetic tradi-
tion pertaining to the “internal senses” and its Patristic counterpart pertaining to the “spiritual senses” in 
the Liber contemplationis, as well as Llull’s original treatment of such material, whereby the traditional 
components are subsumed in unison within the framework of contemplation, cf. (in German) Germann 
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in Chapter 151, § 28 of his Llibre de contemplació en Déu (1273-1274 ?; here-
after LC), it is precisely man’s composite nature, as body conjoined with soul, 
that enables a person to cogitate upon nature itself, while that person’s soul alone 
is what equips him or her to cogitate upon God’s works ad intra, namely, the 
dynamism of His essence.38
So long as man’s lower faculties are ordered towards their higher counter-
parts, so long as, that is, the senses remain subordinate to the intellect and its 
powers and are themselves curbed, and so long as these powers of the intellect 
are ordered towards man’s “first intention”, the disorder of evil, sin and the 
vices can be avoided and the order of goodness and virtue fostered and main-
tained.
To refer to a different aspect of Llull’s thought, however, it is clear that the 
correlative theory, which made its earliest appearance in his Lectura super 
figuras Artis demonstrativae,39 composed in around 1285-1287, namely, the 
theory deriving from his conceptualisation of Trinitarian dynamism in terms 
of the latter’s active, passive and conjunctive components, and the applica-
tion thereof throughout the entire created order, also finds partial expression 
via his relatively late introduction of definitions for the concepts he employs, 
definitions introduced in the Ars inventiva veritatis (hereafter AIV) of 1290.40 
Two such definitions are very well known, namely, those of God and Man. 
The first he defines as follows: Deus est ens deitans; the second, as: homo est 
homificans ens or animal homificans.41 Worth noting is the fact that Lullian 
(2011, 239-269); cf. also Rubio (2017a, 63 and n. 1). I am indebted to Josep Enric Rubio for this reference. 
In Avicenna’s De anima, the cogitative faculty is very closely associated with, though is predominantly 
considered distinctly from, that of the human imagination, which latter is, in fact, ‘physically identical with 
the cogitative faculty, though functionally and definitionally distinct from it’, Black (2013, 61). Cogitative 
thought, for Avicenna, is produced when the activity of the compositive imagination (al-mutaḫayyilah) is 
harnessed by the intellect; cf. Black (2013, 66). Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, in his ST, I, q. 78, a. 4, 
co., argues for the existence of only four internal senses, doing without the Avicennan faculty of cogitation; 
cf. Hasse (2000, 152). For the classification of the “internal senses” in the Latin Aristotelian commentary 
tradition (i.e. Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome), cf. Corbini (2006, 
259-260; 273-276).
38  ORL IV, 310. For the role of the five senses in human knowledge of the divine within Llull’s Liber 
contemplationis, cf. Burnett (2011, 181-208). I am indebted to Alexander Fidora for this reference. For the 
importance of the bodily senses in (and of visual and verbal models for) the contemplation of the divine, 
cf. Rubio (2015) and Rubio (2016).
39  MOG IV, iii (17-224).
40  MOG V, i (1-211); ROL XXXVII.
41  Grammatical theologians in the thirteenth century tended to view the proper nouns deitas and hu-
manitas as “essential terms” in that they signified essentially; cf. Robb (1993, ch. 5, § 2, 130-143, here 133).
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definitions are generated not by genus and differentia, but spring from the 
concept under consideration as regards the dynamism of its being and essence.
Such Lullian definitions, clearly very distinct from the traditional medi-
eval ones deriving from that of Porphyry, Isagoge, III, 8, to the effect that 
man is a “rational mortal animal”,42 nevertheless take their cue from precisely 
such, insofar as they represent Llull’s way of conceptualising and resolving 
the apparent paradox that Christ is a man, insofar as He has a human nature, 
but is nevertheless immortal, in His divinity. Such definitions also enable Llull 
to begin to situate discussion of Christ at a level comparable to that of the uni-
versal rather than solely at that of His singular and perceptible figura, a feature 
associable solely with His human nature.
In Chapter 155 of LC, in fact, Llull categorises the Porphyrian style of 
definition in respect of man as being “literal” rather than “spiritual”, and it 
is also in the light of this that we should view his own style thereof.43 It is 
worth mentioning in this respect that Llull’s relatively late turn to definitions 
may well find its source in St Anselm’s Monologion, Chapters 10 and 11, 
wherein Anselm moves away from the singularity of similitudes or likenesses 
as the basis of the “speech of the mind” (locutio mentis) towards a reliance 
on universalising definitions.44 Such definitions are, by their nature, formed 
of words, and point, in Anselm, to the establishing of a connection between 
internal discourse and linguistic discourse,45 a connection which, as we shall 
see, St Augustine had resolutely excluded.46 If the Anselmian influence upon 
Llull in this respect, prior to the latter’s introduction of definitions into his 
Art, is plausible, then this would suggest that Llull himself may have started 
to move away from a pre-linguistic construal of “internal discourse” to one 
which was more broadly linguistic, albeit that such “language” was itself reli-
ant upon the spiritually conceived content expressed thereby.
Having said this, however, Llull, in fact, introduces a distinction between 
two types of “internal discourse” as generated by the soul, one intellectual, the 
other sensible, in Question 54 of his QADS, written in 1289. The distinction 
itself is based upon the respective objects of the soul’s intentionality, whether 
42  Porphyry (1975, 46).
43  ORL IV, 333.
44  Hurand (2009, 37).
45  Cf. ibid., 42.
46  Cf. ibid., 43.
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these be, for example, God, an angel, the soul or memory, or the very good-
ness of the foregoing, or whether they be the mental images or likenesses of 
sensible things.47
Although Llull’s consistent focus is upon the complete human being, body 
and soul, and the compass of his thought broad enough to include every grada-
tion of being, from the elemental level to that of the divine, it is also true that 
he consistently holds a Bonaventuran view of synderesis vis-à-vis the created 
world, whereby all beings have a natural inclination towards the good, both in 
terms of their signification and their volitional and ontological directedness. 
This means that sensible (or perceptible) things optimally tend to signify their 
intellectual counterparts, that is to say, the sensualitats or sensible natures 
apprehended by the mind optimally tend to signify their corresponding inte-
llectualitats or intellectual natures.48
This inclination also finds expression (Neoplatonically) in the desire each 
being has for its ontological perfection and finds echoes also, as Charles Lohr 
has noted, in thought of St Anselm, in whose dynamic conception of reality 
each being has an active tendency towards the infinite.49 For the above reasons 
and for the sake of argument, as well as for reasons of space, this article will 
disregard the nonetheless important strand of “sensible internal discourse” in 
order to concentrate upon its “intellectual” counterpart. I shall simply add here 
that it is my suspicion that the Lullian inclusion of cogitatio (often equated 
in his writings with the sense of “meditation”) among the “spiritual senses” 
establishes this “sense” as the specific bi-directional link between the human 
intellect and Llull’s “sixth sense”, affatus or the capacity for oral communi-
cation.50
47  MOG IV, iii, 76 (93).
48  Cf. above, n. 36.
49  Lohr (1988, 2).
50  As the reader will see, in his—at the time of writing—forthcoming book, Josep Enric Rubio has 
made important comments to the effect that the Lullian affatus can be seen as the human alternative to an-
gelic speech (for which, see below, §§ 2, 22-23; 2.1., 28-29; 2.3., 33-34), insofar as it is bound to be a sense, 
given that we are sensual animals, but that, as a sense, it connects with the intellect, which we possess on 
account of our being also rational animals. In Rubio’s view, therefore, such sensory support is needed for 
communication, and communication of the Art in particular; cf. Rubio (2017a, 20ff, 45-51). The foregoing 
seems sensible, though to me seems to underplay efforts on Llull’s part to get beyond human speech and the 
written text to the realms of intellectus, superior as this is, in his view, to either speech or the written word.
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2. The Latin tradition and its implications for Ramon Llull
We should note first of all that, outside its strictly religious connotations, 
the term oratio was received by the medievals from the context, first, of its 
early study by the Latin grammarian Priscian, in Book XVII of his Institutiones 
grammaticae. This particular section of Priscian’s text, along with Book XVIII, 
formed a central part of the curriculum at the University of Paris during the thir-
teenth century.51 A second context for its reception consisted in the discussion of 
oratio by the terminist logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, the 
field of logic (or dialectic) by the mid-thirteenth century having come to subsu-
me—and even supersede—that of grammar for investigations within the Arts 
faculty into the philosophy of language, if not also, within the faculty of Theolo-
gy, into matters theological.52 We should not assume, however, that Ramon Llull 
either coincided in his treatment of this theme or shared the respective aims of 
the two abovementioned traditions of thought within the trivium.53 Though Llull 
may not have become familiar with the works of the above terminists until his 
first stay in Paris in 1287-1289, the presence of their writings within academic 
51  Priscian’s Institutionum grammaticum libri XVIII, Book 2, § 4 (in particular), defines the term as 
“Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans [...]”, the term dictio having 
itself been defined, in ibid., Book 2, § 3, as “dictio est pars minima orationis constructae, id est in ordine 
compositae [...]”, both in Priscian (1961b, 53); cf. William of Sherwood (1966, 23, n. 6). Whether the 
formal or semantic criterion regarding the readings congrua/congruam was uppermost in Priscian’s mind 
is open to debate; cf. Cassin et al. (2014, 867). Interestingly, from the point of view of the “syntax” of the 
Lullian Arts, in the opening lines of Book 17, § 1 of the same work, Priscian states that “quemadmodum 
literae apte coëuntes faciunt syllabas et syllabae dictiones, sic et dictiones orationem”, in Priscian (1961a, 
108); cf. also Priscian (2010, 62). As Sven Öhman comments, however, a degree of caution should be used 
if translating oratio as “speech” in the first quotation above from Priscian, cf. Öhman (2002, 105).
52  William of Sherwood (1983, 224); Latin; William of Sherwood (1966, 25); English; Peter of Spain 
(1972, 2-3); Peter of Spain (2014, 104-106/105-107); Latin/English. The former defines oratio (“an ex-
pression” or “a phrase”) as a “vox significativa ad placitum, cuius partes separatae significant”, namely, an 
utterance (thus falling under the rubric of significant vocal sound) significant by convention (ad placitum) 
whose parts are also independently significant, while the latter, concurring, repeats the definition almost 
verbatim. For both William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, orationes, as utterances significant by conven-
tion, are complex examples thereof, William of Sherwood (1983, 223); Latin; William of Sherwood (1966, 
22-23); English; Peter of Spain (1972, 2); Peter of Spain (2014, 102/103); Latin/English, and therefore 
include sentences, phrases and clauses. Cf. also, Batalla (forthcoming), “Introduction”, 1. Scientia sermo-
cinalis. Any reference to “grammar” in the writings of Llull must take account of his own multilingualism 
and the multilingualism he pragmatically desired for the propagation of the faith failing the universal prev-
alence of a language such as Latin. Llull’s own comments on grammar, dispersed throughout his works, are 
well known and have been summarised in Colom Mateu (1973, 57-60). Llull’s positions on grammar have 
also been comprehensively discussed in Badia (1989, 157-182). For an attempt to relate the significations 
of Figure T of Llull’s Art to medieval speculative grammar, cf. Platzeck (1953-1954, 35-49).
53  For a cogent account of the correlation between the modes of the trivium (rhetoric, grammar and 
dialectic) and, respectively, the writings of Saints Augustine, Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, as well as of the 
similarities and differences between the theories of signification and the epistemologies expressed thereby, 
cf. Gaukroger (1978, 134-136; 138).
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milieux prior to that date would, at least, have served to influence the manner 
in which Ramon Llull’s own writings were received.
Having said that, we should note secondly the historiographical problem 
posed by the fact that Ramon Llull consistently, and with only rare exception, 
avoided reference to the sources or auctoritates he used in preparing to write 
any of his works.
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s account of the various kinds of speech in his Peri 
hermeneias or De interpretatione states:
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks 
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all 
men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—
affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are like-
nesses of—actual things—are also the same.54
In this connection, Stephan Meier-Oeser claims that while Aristotle makes a 
clear distinction between mental concepts and spoken language, like Plato, he 
describes the act of thinking as one of internal speech, citing Aristotle’s Meta-
physics, 1009a20, wherein a contrast is set up between a person’s “thought” or 
“mental outlook” and another person’s “theory” or “argument” as expressed in 
words or speech. According to this author, then, “internal discourse” provides 
the basis for “signification, logical argumentation and demonstration” in Aris-
totle, and also provides the primary and proper locus of truth and falsehood.55
Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the passage, in his In libros Peri herme-
neias expositio, composed between 1269-1272, moreover, offers clarification 
54  Aristotle (1995b, 25), J. L. Ackrill (tr.), De interpretatione 1, 16a3-8: “Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in 
voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Et que-
madmodum nec litterae omnibus eadem, sic nec eadem voces; quorum autem hae primorum notae, eaedem 
omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eaedem”, “Translatio boethii”, in 
Aristoteles latinus (1965, 5); “Sunt quidem igitur que in voce earum que in anima passionum symbola et 
que scibuntur eorum que in voce. Et sicut neque littere omnibus eedem, sic neque voces eedem; quorum 
tamen hec signa primum, eedem omnibus passiones anime, et quarum hee similitudines, res iam eedem”, 
“Translatio guillelmi de moerbeka (Recensio ammoniana)”, ibid., 41. The term interpretatio is glossed 
itself in Boethian terms by Thomas Aquinas as “vox significativa [significant vocal sound, as distinct from 
the natural sounds of animals], quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa”, Aquinas 
(1980c, 327), Pro., 3. Interpretatio, on this view, therefore, includes nouns, verbs and sentences (orationes), 
but excludes conjunctions and prepositions, cf. id. As Martin Lenz points out, the likenesses (or similitudes) 
in question here were viewed after 1250 “no longer solely [...] as similitudes of things but as mental signs”, 
Lenz (2008, 303).
55  Meier-Oeser (2011, 149-150). For elucidations of the function of “internal discourse” in many of 
these latter respects within the writings of Ramon Llull, see below (this article), §§ 2.1 and 2.2.
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as to the sense in which Aristotle might have intended the phrase “affections 
in the soul”. Thomas distinguishes customary understandings of the sense of 
passiones animae as “the affections of the sensitive appetite, like anger and joy, 
and the other passions that are commonly and usually called passions of the 
soul” from the “vocal sounds that are significant by human institution” of which 
Aristotle is speaking here.56 Thomas goes on to say that “‘passions in the soul’ 
must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and 
speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the 
teaching of Aristotle”, concluding that Aristotle “calls all of the operations of 
the soul ‘passions’ of the soul. Whence even the conception of the intellect can 
be called a passion [...]”.57 Notably, therefore, Aristotle assigns precedence to 
thought over the conventions of spoken or written language.58
We should also take the time to compare such a conceptualisation with the 
triple sense ascribed to oratio (or outward speech) by Boethius in his com-
mentaries on Aristotle:
There are said by the Peripatetics to be three types of speech: one which may 
be written with letters; another which may be uttered verbally; and a third which 
may be composed in the mind. And if there are three types of speech, there is no 
doubt that the parts of speech are also threefold. Hence, because the verb and 
the noun are the principal parts of speech, there will be some verbs and nouns 
which are written, others which are spoken and others [still] which are treated 
silently in the mind.59
Echoing Aristotle, Boethius goes on to specify that which is signified by 
spoken speech, saying that “these verbs and nouns which are uttered in spoken 
speech signify (denuntiant) the affections in the soul”.60 In addition to this, he 
also affirms the significatory role of concepts, stating that: “Concepts them-
56  Aquinas (1980c, 327), I, 2, 5: “Circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, 
considerandum est quod passiones animae communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, 
gaudium et alia huiusmodi”; id.: “Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana.”
57  Id.: “et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba 
et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis”; id., I, 2, 6: “Sed manifeste invenitur 
in 1 de anima quod passiones animae vocat omnes animae operationes. Unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus 
passio dici potest.”
58  Lenz (2008, 304).
59  Boethius (1987a, 30, ll. 3-10): “dictum est tres esse apud Peripateticos orationes, unam quae litteris 
scriberetur, aliam quae proferretur in voce, tertiam quae coniungeretur in animo. Quod si tres orationes 
sunt, partes quoque orationis esse triplices nulla dubitatio est. Quare quoniam verbum et nomen princi-
paliter orationis partes sunt, erunt alia verba et nomina quae scribantur, alia quae dicantur, alia quae tacita 
mente tractentur”; for different translations of this passage, cf. Suto (2011, 77-78).
60  Id., ll. 20-21: “ea verba et nomina quae in vocali oratione proferuntur animae passiones denuntiant”.
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selves, however, are significative of nothing other than things”.61 Boethius, in 
respect of the above, has been interpreted as defining thought linguistically, 
insofar as the parts of speech themselves appear to be present in the thoughts 
of the mind.62 It is possible to moderate such a conclusion, however, if one 
takes into account the fact that, as one recent author writes, “Boethius’ mental 
speech has a language-like structure, i. e., compositionality, but does not be-
long to any particular language”.63
A further writer of significance with regard to the tradition on “internal 
discourse” as also to Ramon Llull, though writing in Greek, was John of Da-
mascus, particularly his De fide orthodoxa, whose distinctions were taken up 
in the thirteenth century by Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and Thomas 
Aquinas, for which reason I mention him first of all under the heading of the 
Latin tradition (cf. also, below, § 3.1., this article). In Book I, Chapter 13 
of the aforementioned work, John makes a primary distinction between the 
divine and human manifestations of the logos, which human manifestations 
conform to a triad involving: a) a natural movement of the mind, by which 
it moves, thinks and reasons; b) internal thought [or logos endiathetos] as 
spoken in the heart; and c) the spoken word [or logos prophorikos] itself, 
which serves to convey the mind’s messages, and is the means by which hu-
mans communicate their internal thoughts.64 Thomas Aquinas refers directly 
to this passage in his Scriptum super libros Sententiarium (Commentary on 
the Sentences) and his Summa theologiae,65 in which latter, following Albertus 
Magnus, he identifies logos endiathetos with what he calls imaginatio vocis, 
itself defined as the mental representation of external words by the imaginati-
on, a process nevertheless dependent upon a particular language (which was 
not the case within the Greek tradition).66
Two other important writers with respect to Llull’s thinking about “internal 
discourse” are perhaps inevitable in any well-read medieval theological and phi-
losophical thinker. The first of these is St Augustine, in whose writings, parti-
cularly Book XV of his De trinitate, we encounter a number of references to 
61  Ibid., 24, ll. 14-15: “intellectus vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum significativi sunt”.
62  Lenz (2008, 303-304).
63  Suto (2011, 111).
64  John of Damascus (1958, 201); cf. Panaccio (1999, 80). The reader should note that Aristotle had 
already distinguished between an esō logos and an exō logos, for which see Aquinas (1992, 10).
65  Aquinas (1980b, 74), In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 co.; ST, I, q. 34, a. 1.
66  Panaccio (1999, 81). For Aquinas’s verbum interius quod habet imaginationem vocis, cf. above, n. 28.
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what he terms verbum cordis or verbum in corde, using a combined visual and 
verbal model for thought. We should note, in passing, that it is the visual model 
which predominates in Ramon Llull’s vast LC, given that he classes cogitation, 
a spiritual or intellectual “sense”, as “spiritual sight”.67 The term verbum gene-
rally has three senses for Augustine: first, as that which, by its syllables, occu-
pies a temporal period, whether it is spoken or thought; second, that which is 
known and is imprinted on the mind, insofar as it can be brought forth and 
defined using one’s memory, even if its reality is displeasing to us; and, third, 
what amounts to verbum cordis proper, that which, when conceived by the 
mind, is pleasing to us.68 However, the distinction for which he is best known 
in this respect is that between verbum cordis itself, which belongs to no given 
language (and corresponds to the image present within one’s memory insofar 
as it is thought in act);69 verbum imaginabile or imaginatio vocis, namely, the 
mental representation of the spoken word (for example, prayers uttered in 
silence in a given language); and the spoken word itself, a model to which 
Aquinas closely adheres, at least in his Quaestiones disputatae de veritate.70 
Notably, it should be remarked that the verbum cordis and the imaginatio vo-
cis are distinct in both Augustine and Aquinas, the former representing in the 
latter author both the terminus of intellection and the starting point of verbal 
discourse.71 In passing, it should also be mentioned that it was only in the 
1220s that William of Auvergne reconciled the disparate tripartite models of 
verbum and oratio espoused respectively by Augustine and Boethius.72
We should also recall, however, that, in his De doctrina christiana, written 
three years before the De trinitate, Augustine defines a sign as “a thing which 
67  ORL IV, 412: “vista espiritual”. 
68  Augustine (1997a, 100-102), De trinitate, IX, 10, 15; and PL 42: 968-969: “Recte ergo quaeritur, 
utrum omnis notitia verbum, an tantum amata notitia. Novimus enim et ea quae odimus; sed nec concepta, 
nec parta dicenda sunt animo, quae nobis displicent [...] Verbum est igitur, quod nunc discernere et insin-
uare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat, jungitur ei amore verbum ejus. Et 
quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est, et amor in verbo, et utrumque in amante 
atque dicente.”
69  Augustine (1997a, 468), De trinitate, XV, 10, 19; and PL 42: 1071: “Necesse est enim cum verum 
loquimur, id est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus, nascatur verbum quod 
ejusmodi sit omnino, cujusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam 
scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus: quod nec graecum est, nec latinum, nec linguae alicujus alte-
rius”; Augustine (1997a, 490), XV, 14, 24: “Verbum autem nostrum illud quod non habet sonum neque 
cogitationem soni, sed ejus rei quam videndo intus dicimus, et ideo nullius linguae est.”
70  Cf. above, n. 28.
71  Aquinas (1992, 10).
72  Panaccio (1999), 161.
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of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression that 
it presents to the senses”.73 And he goes on to define given (or conventional) 
signs as being “those which living things give to each other, in order to show, 
to the best of their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything that they 
have felt or learnt”.74 Unlike Boethius, for whom words signify (primarily) 
thoughts or concepts and only mediately things, Augustine believes that it 
is the things themselves that are signified by signs.75 Likewise, the Boethian 
view, according to which the concept itself was significative, was antithetical 
to the Augustinian belief that signs act upon the senses.76 It should be noted, 
however, that Boethius can be seen to have also entertained a one-stage se-
mantic theory wherein spoken words immediately signify the thoughts con-
ceptualising things.77
Llull’s interest in St Augustine’s words on the “word” (or even those of 
John of Damascus),78 however, would not have been purely theoretical or re-
lated exclusively to matters concerning “internal discourse”, given the en-
suing and powerful parallels Augustine makes between the Word of God as 
“spoken” inwardly in the Trinity and His Word as “spoken” outwardly and by 
which it was made flesh. Llull’s own Trinitarian and, in particular, Incarnati-
onal theology, therefore, bear close relations in his earlier works, at least, to 
his thinking about human “internal” and “external discourse”. Any changes in 
Llull’s thought about “internal discourse”, not to mention its external coun-
terpart can, therefore, be correlated with and calibrated against any shifts of 
focus identified in his Christology.
The second writer of significance to Ramon Llull is St Anselm, in Chapters 
10 and 11 of whose Monologion a tripartite scheme similar to that of Augustine 
is given, though here distinguishing between, first, internal speech without the 
use of any signs, though availing oneself of either corporeal images or rational 
73  Augustine (1962, 32), De doctrina christiana, II, 1, 1: “Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam 
ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire”; English translation from Augustine 
(1997b, 30).
74  Augustine (1962, 33), De doctrina christiana, II, 2, 3: “Data uero signa sunt quae sibi quaeque 
uiuentia inuicem dant ad demonstrandos quantum possunt, motus animi sui vel sensa aut intellecta quaeli-
bet”; English translation from Augustine (1997b, 30).
75  Cf. Read (2015, 16).
76  Augustine (1962, 33-34), De doctrina christiana, II, 3, 4: “Signorum igitur, quibus inter se homi-
nes sua sensa communicant, quaedam pertinent ad oculorum sensum, pleraque ad aurium, paucissima ad 
ceteros sensus”.
77  Suto (2011, 33-34).
78  John of Damascus (1958, 201); cf. Panaccio (1999, 80).
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understanding, the former through the imagination of a sensible thing’s appe-
arance, the latter through definition of that thing’s universal essence; second, 
internal speech by means of the same signs, though thinking them impercepti-
bly; and, third, speech by means of perceptible signs.79 A distinction, however, 
should be noted between Anselm and Augustine, insofar as the former uses the 
term locutio mentis, albeit rarely, to describe this first kind of speech, internal, 
intuitive and definitional, based upon likenesses and “the same for all”, as it is, 
a term which exceeds the scope of Augustine’s verbum cordis.80
For Anselm, both the terms verbum and locutio mentis indicate the contem-
plation and rational expression of a likeness.81 A further term he introduces, 
again albeit rarely, however, namely, conceptio mentis, adds to this the pos-
sibility of creative composition on the basis of this very likeness, and thus can 
itself be likened to bodily conception.82 I believe that, under Boethian influence, 
Anselm’s contribution to Llull’s thought, above and beyond that of St Augus-
tine, is crucial for understanding Llull’s own move from a theory of internal 
speech which is initially conceived pre-linguistically to one which, at least, 
makes greater allowance for linguistic components within “internal discour-
se”, even if such components belong to no particular language, as well as for 
understanding Llull’s introduction of definitions into his Art.83
I say this because, for Anselm, mental speech, being pre-linguistic and inter-
nal, constitutes not only contemplation of a thing’s likeness, but also its definiti-
on. Furthermore, Anselm confers a linguistic dimension upon “internal discour-
se” through his contention that definition can be as representative of a thing’s 
reality as can its image. I would suggest that it was between the years 1283, at 
the earliest, and 1289 that Llull either deepened his familiarity with or began to 
conceive applications for Boethian and Anselmian thinking on this matter.
79  Anselm (1853, 0158 B-C): “Frequenti namque usu cognoscitur quia rem unam tripliciter loqui 
possumus. Aut enim res loquimur signis sensibilibus, id est, quae sensibus corporeis sentiri possunt, sensi-
biliter utendo; aut eadem signa, quae foris sensibilia sunt, intra nos insensibiliter cogitando; aut nec sensi-
biliter, nec insensibiliter his signis utendo, sed res ipsas, vel corporum imaginatione, vel rationis intellectu, 
pro rerum ipsarum diversitate, intus in nostra mente dicendo”; for English translation, cf. Anselm (2007, 
18). I have reversed the order here for ease of comparison with Augustine’s own tripartite scheme.
80  Hurand (2009, 30-31).
81  Hurand (2009, 42).
82  Id.
83  It is worth speculating that among the multiple reasons behind Llull’s major reformulation of his 
Art in 1290 may have been an increasing awareness on his part of the logical and semantic contributions of 
writers such as William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, under the influence of which he may have taken 
something of a “linguistic turn”.
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As Claude Panaccio has observed, it was Albert the Great who, in his Com-
mentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, reconciled the various authorities 
on “internal discourse”, forcing an Anselmian interpretation upon the tripar-
tite schema of John of Damascus, whereby the latter’s logos endiathetos or 
“internal discourse” comes to be associated with the Augustinian tradition’s 
verbum imaginationis and his “natural movement of the mind”, which he con-
sidered to be the pure light of reason, with, again, the Augustinian tradition’s 
verbum cordis.84 Interestingly, from a Christological point of view, Albert also 
equates the eternal Word, as regards its eternal procession, with the Augustini-
an verbum cordis, namely, pre-linguistic internal discourse, while likening the 
Word made flesh to the scholastic verbum vocis or external utterance, for the 
reason that just as the latter contains more than the thing uttered (res dicta), so 
too does the Son of God contain more than the Father once He has assumed 
flesh, by which flesh He is revealed to us.85
We should also note that in his De sacramentis Christianae fidei, II, 18, 19, 
Hugh of St Victor reiterates verbatim Augustine’s dictum from De trinitate, to the 
effect that “the word that sounds outwardly is the sign of the word that gives light 
inwardly”.86 Earlier in the same work, I, 3, 20, “De verbo intrinseco et extrin-
seco”, Hugh insists on the parallel distinction between internal and external 
discourse in man and God, the former being equated in both man and God to 
wisdom, the latter, in God at least to His works, and in man, to outward spe-
ech, both of which latter make manifest that which formerly was invisible and 
hidden.87 Within this text, Hugh also makes a strict equation between cogitatio 
and the Augustinian verbum cordis or “speech of the heart”, stating:
[...] just as man’s thought (cogitatio) constitutes his internal speech, which 
lies hidden and out of view until it is revealed through utterance in speech; and 
this utterance is the speech of the voice in the same way that thought (cogitatio) 
is the speech of the heart.88 
84  Albert the Great (1893, 46-47).
85  Ibid., 47: “Verbum aeternum [...] potest considerari [...] secundum processionem aeternam, et sic 
maxime convenit cum verbo cordis [...] Verbum autem in carne, hoc est verbum habens similitudinem cum 
verbo vocis: quia sicut illud habet plus quam res dicta, ita Filius plus quam Pater de carne assumpta, in qua 
manifestatus est nobis.”
86  Hugh of St Victor (1854, 616B): “Proinde verbum quod foris sonat, signum est verbi quod intus 
lucet, cui magis verbi competit nomen”; cf. Augustine (1997a, 470), De trinitate, XV, 11, 20; and PL 42: 
1071-1073, here 1071: “Proinde verbum quod foris sonat, signum est verbi quod intus lucet, cui magis verbi 
competit nomen”; English translation from Augustine (2007, 209).
87  Hugh of St Victor (1854, 225A-B).
88  Id.: “[...] quemadmodum cogitatio hominis quasi intrinsecum verbum illius est quod latet et ab-
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That Llull, in fact, observed the commonplace thirteenth-century distincti-
on between thought, speech and writing (deriving from Boethius’s triple sense 
of oratio) can be seen in Chapter 155 of LC, though at a stage in Llull’s deve-
lopment prior to his being able to have had direct access to Boethius’s works 
themselves. In this chapter, Llull makes a number of familiar distinctions, 
the overarching one being bipartite, namely, the distinction between speech 
and understanding (or thought), the former of which he aligns with the realm 
of the senses, the latter with that of the intellect, which latter enjoys greater 
nobility.89 He defines speech in functional terms as being created in man for 
the purpose of revealing and signifying the latter’s understanding (or thought), 
speech again being subordinate to thought, harbouring ambiguity and lability, 
and generally proving insufficient to the task of contemplating God’s Virtues, 
at the very least. Sections 19-21 of this chapter are the most pertinent ones in 
terms of the theory of language.90
Therein Llull, while asserting the limits of both speech and human un-
derstanding, nevertheless claims that the understanding, being intellectual, is 
capable of perceiving truth, and is only hindered from so doing by the corrup-
ting influence of sin on the senses. Such provides the broader epistemological 
and moral framework within which he shows an overall familiarity with the 
distinctions between words, thoughts and things found in the Boethian “se-
mantic triangle”, as well as between spoken words and their written equiva-
lent, not to mention the role of the reader in uncovering the meaning of words. 
The theoretical components regarding language, however, are subordinated 
by Llull to his tropological concerns here, namely, those exemplified by the 
superiority of “spiritual” over a “literal” reading, a distinction which duplica-
tes that of “intellectual” and “sensible”.
The same tripartite distinction as that used by Boethius can, however, be 
found in Chapter 104, § 12 of the Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna (hereafter 
Blaquerna) in the context of comments regarding the optimal manner of con-
templation, again with allusions to both reading and the distinction between 
the three types of speech: internal, spoken and written. At this stage, Llull 
could conceivably have come into contact with Boethius’s writings. I quote at 
some length:
sconditum est donec reveletur per prolationem oris; et est ipsa prolatio vocis verbum similiter ut verbum 
est cogitatio cordis”.
89  ORL IV, 328-329.
90  Ibid., 333.
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So, when he had completed his prayer, he wrote down what he had contem-
plated, and then read what he had written down; yet he did not feel as much 
devotion while he was reading it as he had while he was contemplating the same. 
Contemplation, therefore, is not so devout when one is reading a book as it is 
when one is actually contemplating the arguments written down in that book. The 
reason for this is that, during contemplation, the soul rises higher in order to re-
member, understand and love the Divine Essence than it does when it reads about 
what it has already contemplated, for devotion better befits contemplation than it 
does the written word.91
Interesting here is the manner in which Llull frames this tripartite schema 
within the Christian devotional practices of contemplation or prayer. Prayer, 
of course, could be either liturgical and outwardly spoken or uttered internally 
in silence, assessing each component of that schema as regards its active con-
tribution to such practices. Of interest also, not least in terms of the medieval 
logical and semantic theories to which it aligns Llull’s above statements, is the 
fact that some years later, in his Summa logicae (ca. 1323), in the context of 
a discussion of “natural signification”, William of Ockham discussed the dis-
tinctions, similar to the above, between written, spoken and mental language, 
reaching much the same conclusions as to their hierarchy, though for different 
reasons, while alluding also to the Aristotelian notion of passiones animae, 
which, we recall, are “the same for all”:
Now certain differences are found among these [kinds of] terms. One is that 
a concept or passion of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies. But a 
spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to arbitrary institution. 
From this there follows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term 
can change its signification by convention, but a conceived term does not change 
its signification according to any convention whatsoever.92
91  NEORL VIII, 537: “E quan hac finida sa oració, escriví ço de què havia contemplat e pus llegí ço 
que escrit havia, e no hac tanta de devoció dementre que ho llegia com havia dementre que ho contemplava. 
E per açò la contemplació no és tan devota en lligent lo llibre com és en contemplar les raons escrites en lo 
llibre; e açò és per ço car en la contemplació l’ànima puja pus alt a membrar, entendre, amar la divina es-
sència que no fa quan llig ço que contemplava, car devoció mills se convé a contemplació que a escriptura”; 
cf. Llull (2016, 503-504), English version.
92  William Ockham (1951, 9, ll. 46-52), Summa logicae, I, 1, § 10: “Inter istos autem terminos ali-
quae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est, quod conceptus sive passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid 
significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex 
quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet, quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum 
significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque”; English 
translation (here slightly modified) from Spade (2007, 94).
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As Vincent Spade comments, “[the above] tells us, then, in what sense the 
terms of mental language are supposed to be the same for everyone”.93
To align Ramon Llull, however, with the later doctrine of oratio mentalis 
espoused by William of Ockham (and associated with an intuitionist theory 
of knowledge) might seem to run the risk of both philosophical and histori-
ographical incoherence, given not least that Llull is generally considered to 
hold a realist (or “superrealist”) position and Ockham something resembling a 
nominalist one with regard to the metaphysical problem of universals, a con-
siderable distance separating the two of them across the available spectrum 
of possibilities. Mark D. Johnston has argued that Llull is just such a realist, 
stating that Llull’s
superrealist metaphysics, [if] applied globally to things, concepts and words, [...] 
is in fact a universal allegory, a kind of metaphysics of meaning. Insofar as Llull 
assumes that this meaning necessarily exists in reality prior to existing in thought 
or in language, he never doubts that the world is always speaking even if no hu-
man ears or hearts are listening.94
Johnston’s statement can remain true even if we accept (as I shall go on to 
suggest) that Llull adopts a Boethian position whereby causal priority is as-
signed to thought over spoken speech, for the reason that though the real may 
retain its metaphysical primacy, mankind aspires to and angels accomplish 
the greatest approximation thereto in thought itself, that is to say, internal 
discourse. The Lullian project wherein the ordo essendi and the ordo cognos-
cendi meet and coincide is also reflected, I believe, at the level of a desire on 
Llull’s part to attain the greatest possible reconciliation between the real and 
the intellectual or conceptual. Things, concepts and words (or reality, thought 
and language), for Llull, can not only correspond but also coincide to the 
extent that they, being part of the same created theophanic whole, resemble 
the Exemplar, namely God, and His exemplary and co-essential Ideas, namely the 
divine Dignities, the aseity of this exemplar-God being iterated in thought (as 
self-love), in language or divine internal utterance (as filiation) and in reality 
(as the incarnated Christ annunciated by the Holy Spirit). Thus ontology, epis-
temology, metaphysics, theology and medieval theories of language and mind 
fully overlap.
It is worth noting, however, with regard to the above quoted passage from 
93  Id.
94  Johnston (1996, 34).
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Blaquerna that, in the LC, Llull even categorises reading as a “sensible” form 
of prayer.95 And again, in Blaquerna, Chapter 108, § 11, Llull concludes his 
prayer and contemplation with the words (and I quote): “In this way, and much 
better than can be either spoken or written, did Blaquerna contemplate God’s 
Virtues within his soul by means of the Pater noster”.96
In contrast to the above, however, by 1290, the date at which Llull com-
posed his Oracions de Ramon, a work designed to satisfy the desire of many 
people, and I translate, “to know how to acquire a method whereby they may 
learn to pray to God unstintingly and to love Him with a very lofty and great 
love”,97 he devotes the entire final part of the work to recommending (here, 
XIII, 37, § 2) that his reader go back over the preceding twelve parts, paragra-
ph by paragraph, “so that, when one has fervently read the paragraph, let one 
ponder in one’s mind what one has read: one will then find sweetness and love 
in such pondering; and let the speech of one’s mind flourish, by considering, 
worshipping and contemplating God’s Trinity”.98
The fact that Augustine’s verbal model of thought supposed a radical divi-
sion between verbum and that by which it is externalised, may have seemed to 
represent a major disadvantage to Llull, not only in terms of the theorisation of 
internal and external discourse, namely, of how one manifests one’s thoughts 
to another, but also of the practice of such manifestation to others, others who 
may carry misconceptions regarding the beliefs, if it is beliefs, that one is 
trying to convey. It is for this reason that Llull has recourse to the speech of 
angels, precisely as a model for human “internal discourse”. Indeed, In Dis-
tinction IV, Chapter 3, § 1 of his Llibre dels àngels, Llull asserts that human 
internal discourse specifically consists in the soul’s communication with 
the internal discourse of angels.99 In appealing to this model, Llull sets out 
from the traditional basis of an analogy between angelic and human mental 
speech, stating in Distinction IV, Chapter 1, of the same work, that:
95  ORL VIII, 3.
96  NEORL VIII, 552: “Enaxí, e molt mills que no·s pot recomptar ni scriure, contemplava Blaquerna 
en sa anima les virtuts de Deu ab lo Pater noster”; Llull (2016, 518), English version.
97  ORL XVIII, 315: “aver manera per la qual sapien molt de pregar Deus e amar de molt alta e gran 
amor”.
98  ORL XVIII, 380: “On, con hom aurà legit ferventment lo palagrafi, retorn hom en sa pensa so que 
aurà legit: adonchs atrobarà dousor e amor en aquell retornament; e montiplich les paraules de sa pensa, 
consirant la Trinitat de Deu, adorant e contemplant”.
99  ORL XXI, 360-361: “enaxí con unes paraules sensuals se parlen ab altres paraules sensuals, enaxí 
les mentals paraules de l anima se parlen ab les del àngel”.
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Just as people make mental use of the acts of the powers of their soul, their 
memory remembering and their intellect understanding and their will loving the 
objects they receive, so too does an angel speak to itself when it remembers, un-
derstands and loves itself distinctly [...].100
Llull goes on to give a more comprehensive definition of angelic speech 
later in the same section, stating that it consists in the “ordered disposition” 
found in the fact that an angel, by its own particular nature:
understands, loves and concords with that which it behoves justice to bring 
into accord as regards memory intellect and will by means of goodness, greatness, 
power, wisdom, love and perfection.101
The text of this work shows, however, that it is precisely in the opposite 
direction that the analogy should be made or, in fact, is recommended. Llull, 
in this work, is enjoining humanity to conduct its “internal discourse” by me-
ans solely of its intellectual powers, as must angels, to the exclusion of the 
imagination and the bodily senses.
In summary, then, and in the simplest terms, by the mid-thirteenth century 
there was both a powerful Aristotelian-Boethian strand and a powerful Au-
gustinian-Anselmian strand of thought as regards “internal discourse”, and the 
prevalent tendency was to reconcile Aristotle with Augustine, by integrating 
the former’s thought into the framework of that of the latter.102 In this context, 
it might be possible to judge the tenor of Llull’s thought in this respect, at least 
within the period 1278-1290, by assessing whether his use of the term simili-
tudo or likeness owed more to the Boethian than to the Anselmian use of this 
term, and to establish thereby the time of his acquaintance with both of these 
writers during these years.
100  ORL XXI, 354: “Enaxí con en home mentalment usen de lurs actus les potencies de la ànima, 
membrant memòria e entenent enteniment e amant la volentat los objects que prenen, enaxí angel parla ab 
si mateix con se remembra e s entén e s ama distinctament.”
101  ORL XXI, 355: “entén e ama e concorda ço que justicia cové convenir de memòria, enteniment e 
volentat per bonea, granea, poder, saviea, amor e perfecció”.
102  Panaccio (1999, 167).
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2.1. Thought, prayer and truth, and the precedence of mental over 
vocal speech
One would think that any discussion of “internal discourse” or “mental 
speech” should first consider speech in general, or rather, external speech. As 
we shall see, however, Ramon Llull and the previously mentioned Boethian 
tradition consider thought, that is to say, “mental speech”, to have both causal 
and natural priority over vocal sounds or “spoken speech”.
It is a well-known fact that Aristotle’s De interpretatione, in fact, concen-
trated on only one of the five classical divisions of oratio (or speech), namely, 
oratio enuntiativa, that is to say, the declarative (or indicative) sentence, which 
bears either truth or falsity.103 Interestingly, in this work, Aristotle states that:
Every sentence is significant [...] by convention [...], but not every sentence is 
a [declarative] sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity. There is 
not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true [n]or 
false.104
103  Cf. Stock (1983, 368). Though Stock does not mention them, the five divisions or classes of state-
ment are variously defined by Boethius in his First and Second Commentaries on the Peri hermeneias as 
including the following: deprecative, interrogative, imperative, vocative and indicative; the First Commen-
tary drops the reference to interrogative statements, but instead makes a distinction between optative and 
deprecative statements; for the foregoing, cf. Grande Alija (1996, 24 and n. 20); cf. also Boethius (1987a, 
70-71; 1987b, 95ff.). Cf. also Aquinas (1980c, 327), Pro., 3, in which the author states that ‘ideo sola oratio 
enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur, ceterae vero orationes, ut optativa et 
imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu ha-
betur’. Note that William of Sherwood’s division differs slightly from the Boethian ones, cf. Latin: William 
of Sherwood (1983, 224); English: William of Sherwood (1966, 25). 
104  Aristotle (1995b, 26), J. L. Ackrill (tr.), here slightly amended, De interpretatione, 4, 17a1-4: 
“Est autem oratio omnis quidem significativa [...] secundum placitum; enuntiativa vero non omnis, sed 
in qua verum vel falsum inest; non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio quidem est, sed neque vera 
neque falsa”, “Translatio boethii”, in Aristoteles latinus (1965, 8; emphasis added); “Est autem oratio om-
nis quidem significativa [...] secundum confictionem; enuntiativa autem non omnis, sed in que verum aut 
falsum contingit dicere; non in omnibus autem existit; puta optatio oratio quidem, sed neque vera neque 
falsa”, “Translatio guillelmi de moerbeka (Recensio ammoniana)”, ibid., 43 (emphasis added). Note the 
different divisions of oratio to which Boethius and William, respectively, assign prayer, for which see 
previous note. Aristotle had already commented in the opening chapter of this work that “a sign [...] signi-
fies something but not, as yet, anything true or false—unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added (either simply or with 
reference to time)”, ibid., 25; again, J. L. Ackrill (tr.), De interpretatione, 16a16-18: “signum [...] significat 
aliquid, sed nondum verum vel falsum, si non vel ‘esse’ vel ‘non esse’ addatur vel simpliciter vel secundum 
tempus”, “Translatio boethii”, in Aristoteles latinus (1965, 6); William of Moerbeke’s translation shows 
little variation from the foregoing. Taken together, these two passages would seem to suggest a strangely 
circular argument in Aristotle’s reasoning, namely: a) the truth (or falsity) of a sign depends on its forming 
part of a declarative sentence; b) the truth (or falsity) of a sentence depends on its being declarative; and c) 
being a declarative sentence itself depends on the presence of a criterion of truth and falsity. Aristotle thus 
defines truth in propositional terms and propositions in terms of their capacity to bear truth (or falsity). I 
would argue that Llull himself attributes truth value to sentences other than those which are declarative, 
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It is clear from Llull’s writings on prayer that he disagreed with the stance 
Aristotle took on this matter. As we can see from a mature work by Llull, 
the Oracions de Ramon, composed in Barcelona in 1290 and presented to 
James II of Aragon as a gift for his wife Blanche of Anjou, Llull certain-
ly believed that prayer could be addressed to truth (he apostrophises God as 
“one God, one Lord, one Creator, one Truth”),105 be concerned with truth and 
error as regards religious beliefs and be aimed at re-establishing humanity as 
a whole upon the “path of truth”.106 My sense, in reading this short work, is 
that Llull is suggesting that if prayer is a form of thought, which, in his view, 
it is (“praying to God in your thought”),107 and, as we shall see, thoughts in 
combination can bear truth-values, as can words in combination, then prayers 
themselves consisting of, in Llull’s words, “the speech of [one’s] thought” 
can possess truth-value.108 Given that prayers do not typically consist solely of 
declarative sentences, Lullian prayer would either have to do so or extend the 
realm of truth beyond the indicative mood.109
Another quite simple reason as to why prayers can possess truth-value, for 
Llull, is found in Dist. XL, ch. 315 of his considerably earlier LC. Here we see 
that the third form or “figure” of prayer he enumerates, that is to say, prayer 
which consists of good deeds and the practice of the virtues, a figure combining 
the two less elevated forms thereof, namely, sensible and intellectual prayer, 
can possess truth-value precisely insofar as it resembles and participates in the 
divine Virtues themselves, among which “truth” is a conspicuous presence.110 
He specifies, moreover, that the veracity of one’s prayers, or more particularly 
of the “figures” wherein and whereby they are articulated, is guaranteed solely 
by the correct ordering of one’s sensible and intellectual faculties, stating in a 
significant metaphor that “[j]ust as a true mirror signifies truly the figures [or 
forms] represented therein, so too are these three figures of prayer truly repre-
sented by the ordering that is carried out within these three figures”.111 As we 
even to signs alone, possibly as a result of Neoplatonic influences, whereby individual signs, not to mention 
things and thoughts, can enjoy the equation between goodness, beauty and truth.
105  ORL XVIII, 349: “.j. deu, .j. senyor, un creador, una veritat”.
106  Id.: “via de veritat”.
107  Ibid., 389: “pregant Deu en ta pensa”.
108  Ibid., 380: “les paraules de sa pensa”.
109  Note that William G. Lycan proposes that non-indicative sentences in general (including impera-
tives, questions and requests) can possess truth-value, in Lycan (2008, 118); for further discussion of this 
claim, cf. also Daly (2013, 93-94).
110  ORL VIII, 5-6.
111  Ibid., 6: “Enaxí com lo mirall vertader significa vertaderament les figures que a ell se representen, 
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see later in this same chapter, Llull also believed that, in a non-trivial sense, 
there could be such things as false and true (sensible or intellectual) prayer,112 
a false figure in the case of false intellectual prayer consisting of false inten-
tion, false remembering, false understanding and false willing,113 the falsity in 
each case here being equated to belief in a false religion.114
In Chapter 155, §§ 1, 3 and 4 of LC, a chapter which employs the spiritual 
sense of “cogitation” to delineate the concordances and contrarieties existing 
between the human understanding and speech, Llull clearly asserts the supe-
riority of the former over the latter on a number of grounds, namely: that 
the former is intellectual, the latter sensible; that speech plays a subordinate 
role in revealing and signifying human understanding; and that the unders-
tanding is internal and thus closer to the soul than is speech, which is exter-
nal.115 What’s more, in comments addressing the relative truth-values attac-
hing to thoughts and speech, he states that the understanding (i. e. the locus of 
thinking) has greater capacity than does speech to demonstrate the truth, again 
on the grounds of the former’s closer union with the soul. And he goes on to 
say that the very fact that the understanding can always understand more truth 
than speech can convey is the source of the discord and contrast that can arise 
between understanding and speech, a point having as much relevance to his 
contemplative as it does to his apologetic project.116
In the latter respect, it is important to observe that Llull attributes the mi-
sapprehensions that, in his view, unbelievers entertain as regards the Chris-
tian Articles of Faith, to human communication or speech rather than to the 
unbelievers themselves. In the same chapter, Llull even specifies the need 
for a “mean” or “middle” between the extremes of conflicting speech and 
intellect. Effectively, what Llull recommends to occupy this position is that 
affirmations regarding an intellectual understanding of a matter should take 
precedence over what is signified in speech, when the latter is contrary to the 
former.117 He goes on to attribute ambiguity solely to speech and not to inte-
enaxí aquestes .iij. figures d oracio son afigurades vertaderament per l ordonament qui es fet en les .iij. 
figures.”
112  Ibid., 7-8.
113  Ibid., 8.
114  Ibid., 9.
115  ORL IV, 328-329.
116  ORL IV, 329.
117  Ibid., 331-332.
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llectual understanding,118 and to assert the concordance of speech and unders-
tanding in syllogisms and the contrariety of the two former in paralogisms, 
the former occurring when the senses are subordinate to the intellect and the 
latter, when not.119
We should note in respect of truth-value, mentioned above, that in Boet-
hius’s reading of Aristotle, truth and falsity in a proposition are dependent 
upon the existence of combination (or composition) and division therein, in 
the case of thoughts as of words. Hence, for Boethius, even thoughts admit of 
compositionality. Thoughts or words not subject to composition or division, 
namely, in the case of words, single nouns or verbs, cannot possess truth-
value, though they may signify thoughts conceptualising things. Even as early 
as LC, where, in Chapter 328, Ramon Llull introduces the quasi-algebraic no-
tation of concepts and initiates their combinatorial interactions, these concepts 
later in his Arts being dominated by the divine attributes or “Dignities”, we 
can see that such concepts, and subsequently the “Dignities” themselves, rely 
at least in part upon the principle of compositionality for their truth-value.120 
We should also note at this point, that Llull’s incorporation of the principle of 
“Doubt”, alongside “Affirmation” and “Negation”, within the “Black Trian-
gle” of Figure T from the time of his Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, 
composed circa 1274, may well have been influenced by Augustine’s delibera-
tions thereon in his De trinitate, XV, to the effect that both doubt and lies can 
be considered “internal discourse”, because in one’s heart one is still saying 
that which one knows.121
I would also suggest that, while in Montpellier during the period 1278-
1283, Llull would have acquainted himself with material that might have con-
firmed any earlier sense he had that thought itself, that is to say, “internal 
discourse” was the true means or medium of communication and thus held a 
more privileged position than “external discourse” itself. We should note in 
118  Ibid., 332.
119  Ibid., 333.
120  ORL VIII, 155-168.
121  Augustine (1997a, 492), De trinitate, XV, 15, 24; and PL 42: 1077-1078, here 1077: “Falsum est 
ergo isto modo verbum nostrum, non cum mentimur, sed cum fallimur. Cum autem dubitamus, nondum 
est verbum de re de qua dubitamus, sed de ipsa dubitatione verbum est. Quamvis enim non noverimus an 
verum sit unde dubitamus, tamen dubitare nos novimus: ac per hoc cum hoc dicimus, verum verbum est; 
quoniam quod novimus dicimus. Quid, quod etiam mentiri possumus? Quod cum facimus, utique volentes 
et scientes falsum verbum habemus: ubi verum verbum est mentiri nos; hoc enim scimus. Et cum mentitos 
nos esse confitemur, verum dicimus: quod scimus enim dicimus; scimus namque nos esse mentitos.”
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passing here, however, that while Aristotle distinguished between an organ 
(or instrument), a medium and an object of communication, Llull made a dis-
tinction between the organ, the instrument and the object thereof, the former 
two possibly coinciding, though differing in essence.122 Llull may well have 
omitted the term medium in his classification precisely because he conceived 
of thought itself as that very medium.
Interestingly enough, in the context of a discussion of angelic speech—and 
I have suggested earlier that Llull himself conceives of angelic speech as the 
model for human “internal discourse”—St Thomas Aquinas asserts in a num-
ber of works that such speech does not require a medium, insofar as the sign 
is not the means whereby the concept is rendered external in angels, but rather 
the concept itself constitutes the sign in respect of its ordinatio ad alterum or 
intentionality, while for man the concept constitutes the signified of external 
speech (In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 ad 3).123 And whereas earlier in Thomas’s 
works, verbum cordis had been associated with the pre-linguistic formation of 
the internal verbum, in In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 co., he equates the former 
in angels with ordinatio ad alterum.124
2.2. Ramon Llull: The “semantic triangle” and demonstration
Llull’s prioritisation of the psychological/cognitive, in his early works, at 
least, has its roots in his desire to resolve the ambiguity of man’s nature as 
both a corporeal and a spiritual being in the direction of the subordination 
of man’s sensory apparatus and thus of external speech itself, via arguments 
pointing to their insufficiency; the prioritisation of the intellectual powers; 
and the proposal that a pre-linguistic and superlatively intellectual mode of 
communication is possible without recourse to speech.125 By such prioritisa-
tion and subordination, Llull invokes his doctrine of intentions and reveals 
contemplation of the divine attributes and of the activity of these both within 
122  Cf. Pistolesi (1996, 11-23).
123  Aquinas (1980b, 156): “Unde non exigitur aliquod medium per quod deferatur locutio unius ad 
alterum; sed sufficit ad hoc solus ordo intentionis unius ad manifestandum alteri”; Aquinas (1980d, 61), 
De veritate, q. 9, a. 6 ad 4: “Unde non oportet ponere aliquod medium per quod deferatur aliquid ab uno in 
alterum”. Cf. Rosier-Catach (2009, 81).
124  Aquinas (1980b, 156): “Quando ergo speciem conceptam ordinat ut manifestandam alteri, dicitur 
verbum cordis”. Cf. Rosier-Catach (2009, 79). Rosier-Catach, in fact, misidentifies this passage as being 
found in In I Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 co.
125  Cf. Mark D. Johnston regarding Llull’s prioritisation of the psychological/cognitive aspects of 
speech as a sense over those of communication between individuals per se, in Johnston (1990a, 22).
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the Godhead and in creation as the driving force behind the construction of the 
elaborate demonstrative mechanism that was his Art.
Josep Enric Rubio has drawn my attention to an important passage in the 
prologue to the AIV (1290), a work which marks a turning-point in Llull’s 
career insofar as it both initiates the Ternary Phase proper and reduces the 
Figures to four, while also renouncing the use of letters from the Alphabet 
within the text (though nevertheless employing them within the Figures).126 
The passage in question states:
Yet since the existence and activity of the things upon which we are fo-
cusing are more forceful and numerous in themselves than are the likenesses 
thereof in the intellect, and these likenesses more powerful and abundant in the 
intellect than are the significations thereof in words, there is a great distance, 
therefore, between such significations and the things to which they pertain. Out 
of necessity, therefore, we must invent words, both on account of the scarcity of 
significations and for the sake of the power and exigencies of the Art, and must 
occasionally utter unusual words, as will be made clear below.127
Here, by pointing to the existence of an inverted pyramidal hierarchy des-
cending from things (or, more precisely, the existence and activity of things) 
via likenesses in the mind to the significations of words, Llull succinctly pro-
vides a rationale for his use of inusitata verba, specifically, as he goes on to 
show, the terminology relating to his correlative theory. In doing so, Llull is 
testifying to his belief in the insufficiency of language, that is to say, both 
in terms of the numerical insufficiency of its units (propter significatorum 
paucitatem) in relation to the things and likenesses lying above them (plures, 
ampliores) and in terms of the insufficiency of its capacities, in this case, sig-
nificatory capacities, in relation to the power (vehementiores, majores) that 
resides in, once again, the things and likenesses lying above them.
126  ROL XXXVII, ‘De prologo’, 7: “Quoniam [AD] per terminos in litteras redactos procedit, [AIV] 
ista uero suis propriis terminis seu principiis contenta est. Nec alia nota litterarum indiget sicut illa, ut, qui 
demonstratiuae Artis euitant alpabetum, terminos seu principia huius artis sub suis propriis significatis 
attingant” ; cf. MOG V, i, “De prologo”, 1-2 (1-2), here 1 (1).
127  Ibid., 7-8: “Et quoniam ita est quod existentiae et operationes rerum, de quibus intenditur, vehe-
mentiores atque plures sunt in se ipsis quam earum similitudines in intellectu, et ipsae similitudines maiores 
et ampliores quam in sermonibus earum significata, magna est ergo distantia significatorum a rebus suis. Ea 
propter de necessitate nos oportet fingere uerba, licet propter significatorum paucitatem et de ui et de neces-
sitate artis aliquotiens inusitata uerba proferre, uelut infra patebit”; cf. MOG V, i, 1-2 (1-2). For a different 
account of this passage than the one I go on to give, cf. also Rubio (2017a, 38-40). I should like to thank 
Josep Enric Rubio for drawing this passage to my attention.
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In this instance, it seems Llull is trying to transcend language, while re-
maining notionally, at least, within language, by extending and supplementing 
language through the coinage of neologisms (fingere, inusitata verba profer-
re) precisely on account of the numerical insufficiency of words (propter sig-
nificatorum paucitatem). It is only if we take the term paucitas, however, to 
condense within a single term the contrary of both of the non-synonymous 
terms within the pairings vehementiores (MOG: majores) et plures, in the first 
case, and majores et ampliores, in the second, pairings which themselves are 
nevertheless synonymous with each other, though show variation for rheto-
rical reasons, that one could construe Llull as also claiming that language 
lacked significatory power (as well as numerical sufficiency).
However, if one does so, one has to admit the synthetic and polysemic 
nature of a single term, a fact which would itself suggest very strongly that 
language, as shown by a single term, itself indicating scarcity and lack, ac-
tually points to the very capacity which, by reason of paucitas itself, it is 
claimed that language, in fact, fails to possess. What Llull seems to be doing 
here, therefore, is not to bypass likenesses or concepts, themselves the content 
of “internal discourse”, in order to achieve greater correspondence between 
terms and their referents, but rather to harness the richness of those very like-
nesses which, mercifully, are fewer in number than the essences and activities 
of external reality. All the foregoing is done in order to reinforce and meet the 
requirements of the Art (de ui et de necessitate artis), the Art here seeming 
to be the weakest element of all, situated at the inverted apex of the pyramid.
To continue this excursus, we should not forget here that Llull’s Art, from 
its very outset, sought to be compendious and, for pragmatic reasons, became 
increasingly so over time. The principle in operation here is, therefore, one 
of conceptual parsimony within which one seeks to reduce to a manageable 
number the set of concepts and principles by which one interprets reality. Ex-
ternal reality only enjoys a certain primacy as “the real” by virtue of being the 
occasion of certain types of mental act and mental content; the human mind, 
however, though not conceived as such, is governed by the three Augustinian 
powers of the human intellective soul, and however connected this may be 
to man’s sensible soul, that intellective soul is ontologically superior to both 
external reality (bar God Himself and angels, in certain respects) and any sen-
sible component or ideation of the human being conjoined to it.
The multiplicity and seeming ontological plenitude of external reality re-
present a challenge to the human being on the very levels of its multiplicity 
oratio, verbum, sermo and “les paraules de sa pensa” 35
and plenitude. A person’s struggle to comprehend, to respond morally and 
ethically to, and to divide up materially and conceptually that reality, as well 
as that person’s struggle to express in words the thoughts he or she has concer-
ning that reality are functions of that person’s human nature and the position it 
finds itself in within the world. However, the desire to perfect all these things 
is equally human, in Llull’s view. Hence, Llull’s reluctance potentially to in-
crease the number of words unnecessarily, an enterprise he ultimately justifies 
on the grounds that such increase, such multiplication, is, in fact, de ui et de 
necessitate artis, as if no other motive would be sufficient.
To assert that Llull was averse to multiplication in his Art tout court, would 
be a strange claim to make, given the 1,680 (potentially syllogistic) reasons 
generated in the “Table” of his Ars generalis ultima (1305-1308; hereafter 
AGU) as a result of the “Multiplication of the Fourth Figure”.128 However, 
Llull is averse to unprofitable and promiscuous multiplication at an ontolo-
gical level, at the very least, and endorses a form of what I would call “ontic 
parsimony” found only in the figure and Person of Christ, in Whom the Dig-
nities find repose. Christ thus represents the means whereby concordance is 
achieved between God and man and the infinite or indefinite and unfulfilled 
multiplication of the likenesses of God’s “Reasons” in creation finds its limit 
and completion. However, in Christ there is found to be a multiplication 
of the concordance between infinite and finite. Of course, in Neoplatonic 
terms, endless multiplication represents the increasing and ongoing distan-
cing of the many from the One, the desired return to which would thereby 
be frustrated. The same principle of parsimony, here aligned with the reditus 
ad Deum and applied to God’s outwardly spoken Word, is also applicable to 
the spoken and written words of mankind.
In the absence of Christ’s Incarnation, according to Llull in his De con-
templatione Raymundi (August 1297), there would be no such terminus or 
repose, for the “Reasons” would endlessly aspire to reproduce their likenesses 
in creation and thus their multiplication would be interminable. The Reasons 
cannot achieve their telic destiny, their optimum activation and actualisation, 
in creation without the Incarnation for, states Llull, “God’s great goodness 
will always wish to multiply its likeness in its effect, and His greatness simi-
larly, and so on for the other Reasons, and they would never be able to attain 
their chosen end”.129
128  ROL XIV.
129  ORL XVIII, I “Quomodo possumus Deum contemplari”, iii, 2, 400-401: “tua maxima bonitas 
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In Josep Rubio’s view, the magna distantia between words and things (vox/
verbum and res) of which Llull speaks above is exacerbated by the fact that 
one has to pass through concepts (intellectus/similitudines) in the process of 
signification.130 If I am correct in my interpretation, however, Llull attribu-
tes much greater pre-eminence to internal discourse (including, though not 
limited to, the operations of the three powers of the human intellective soul, 
concepts or likenesses and logical structures) than Rubio would allow, and he 
does so for reasons I shall now attempt to discuss. I would attribute Llull’s 
position in these respects, at least in part, to his possible adoption of a Boethi-
an semantic theory, a theory whereby words signify either primarily thoughts 
and only mediately things or immediately the thoughts which conceptualise 
things.
We should note, therefore, that the thought and writings of Ramon Llull bear 
a distinctive relationship to the so-called “semantic triangle” consisting of in-
tellectus, res and verbum (or vox), namely, thoughts, things and spoken words, 
as well as to the three types of speech (i. e. mental speech, spoken speech and 
written speech) attributed by Boethius to the Peripatetics and endorsed by him 
in his second commentary on Peri hermeneias, the first type of which, though 
not explicitly mentioned in that work by Aristotle himself, does appear, in 
fact, in the latter’s Analytica posteriora, which states (in translation):
[...] for demonstration, like syllogism, is concerned not with external but with 
internal discourse, and it is always possible to object to the former, but not al-
ways possible to do so to the latter [...].131
Internal and external discourse are discussed in this passage in the context 
of the distinction between a hypothesis (i.e. a suppositio or radix posita)—a 
provable proposition assumed without proof and accepted by one’s interlocu-
suam similitudinem semper appeteret multiplicare in effectu suo, et tua infinita magnitudo similiter, et sic 
de aliis tuis racionibus, et nunquam optatum finem attingere possent”; cf. ROL XVII, 26, ll. 24-28. Parts of 
the foregoing two paragraphs draw upon Hughes (2002, 227).
130  Rubio (2017a, 40).
131  An. post. I, 10, 76b24-7; English translation in Aristotle (1966, 72-73). Note, however, that Jona-
than Barnes translates the terms “external” and “internal discourse” as “external argument” and “argument 
in the soul”/“internal argument”, respectively; cf. Aristotle (1995c, 124). Note also that the translation of 
this text by Gerard of Cremona (from the Arabic) renders the terms as sermo exterior/extrinsecus and ratio 
intrinseca, respectively, while that of James of Venice and the recension of William of Moerbeke coincide 
in their renderings of exterius/exterior ratio and ad eam que est in anima/interius/interior ratio, also re-
spectively; cf. Aristoteles Latinus (1968, 207; 24; 296, respectively). The pagination in the following four 
quotations refers respectively to the Latin versions of James of Venice, Gerard of Cremona and William 
of Moerbeke.
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tor—and a postulate (here considered illegitimate, i.e. a petitio/quaestio), 
this postulate being the same assumption made when the interlocutor either 
has no opinion or a contrary one to the person making that assumption.132 
Both hypotheses and postulates are themselves distinct from axioms, which 
are true because of themselves and must necessarily appear to be so.133 Further 
distinctions are drawn between a) hypotheses and definitions (or “terms”), 
insofar as the latter only need to be understood;134 and b) between hypotheses, 
illegitimate postulates and definitions, the former two being either universal or 
particular, the latter neither.135 What should also be noted is that, for Aristotle, 
hypotheses constitute propositions (insofar as they make assertions regarding 
a thing’s existence or non-existence) while definitions do not. Whether Llull 
would have opted for the previously mentioned Anselmian or the Aristotelian 
construal of definitions is of less importance than the fact that they would both 
have been suggestive to him of the possibility of a “speech of the mind” that 
was, at least potentially, universal and demonstrative.
In the above respect, it should first be pointed out that in Llull’s system 
hypotheses (namely, the Articles of Faith) are susceptible of and form the object 
of proof and indeed require such, given that they are in most cases not accepted 
by his interlocutors. As Anthony Bonner makes clear, however, Llull operates 
neither precisely according to the Euclidean axiomatic model whereby “prees-
tablished principles are used to prove successive new principles (theorems)”, 
nor, would I say, to the Aristotelian model of demonstration as outlined above. 
Bonner shows that Llull does not work from principles to the thing to be pro-
ved, but, in fact, moves in the opposite direction, testing the very hypotheses 
against those principles.136
However, in my view, when read in terms of the Aristotelian theory of 
demonstration presented in the Posterior Analytics,137 Llull’s “hypotheses”, in 
132  Aristoteles Latinus (1968, 24-25; 207-208; 296), An. post. I, 10, 76b27-34; English translation in 
Aristotle (1995c, 124-125).
133  Aristoteles Latinus (1968, 24; 207; 296), An. post. I, 10, 76b23-24; English translation in Aristotle 
(1995c, 124).
134  Aristoteles Latinus (1968, 25; 208; 296), An. post. I, 10, 76b35-37; English translation in Aristotle 
(1995c, 125).
135  Aristoteles Latinus (1968, 25; 208; 296), An. post. I, 10, 77a3-4; English translation in Aristotle 
(1995c, 125).
136  Cf. Bonner (2007, 81).
137  For an extended survey of the influence of this work, among others, on Llull’s thinking and meth-
ods, see Ruiz Simon (1999).
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fact, start out as “postulates”, given, at best, that they are inimical to the be-
liefs of his (Muslim and Jewish) interlocutors; they gain the status of “hypot-
heses” only when those same interlocutors have assimilated and accepted two 
crucial (though in the second case, well-concealed) features of the Arts of 
Llull’s “Quaternary Phase”, namely: a) the unaccompanied role played by F 
and G (memory remembering and intellect understanding, respectively) from 
Figure S, unaccompanied, that is, by either D (will loving) or H (will hating), 
on the grounds of a prior supposition of N (the combined acts of K, L and M, 
i. e. memory forgetting, intellect not knowing and will loving or hating, again 
respectively); and b) the presence of the sub-principles of “Possibility and 
Impossibility” (alongside those of “Non-being” and “Being”) under the letter 
“P” representing “Doubt” in the “Black Triangle” of Figure T (wherein “O” 
= “Affirmation” and “Q” = “Negation”). These two features are intended to 
ensure as much receptiveness in an interlocutor potentially hostile to the—for 
Llull, at least—true suppositions or hypotheses of the Christian faith.138
Second, it should be noted that proof of such hypotheses rests upon the axi-
oms of his system (at least in the form outlined by Bonner above), namely, the 
divine attributes or “Dignities”, at least when in the form of propositions such as 
“God is good”, “God is great”, “God is eternal”, and so on. These Dignities are 
themselves interconvertible or, as Llull calls it, “equiparable”, such that it is also 
true that “God’s goodness is great”, “God’s goodness is eternal”, “God’s great-
ness is good”, “God’s greatness is eternal”, “God’s eternality is good”, “God’s 
eternality is great”, and so on, and they can, therefore, be used in the loftiest 
form of proof, demonstratio per aequiparantiam, of Llull’s own devising.139
Third, it should be stated that this Aristotelian assimilation between de-
monstration, syllogistic and “internal discourse”, may well have served as an 
additional spur to that found in St Augustine’s De trinitate, Book XV, whe-
138  Cf. Bonner (2007, 46, 81-82). Bonner points to the oppositional nature of the pairing “Demonstra-
tion––Hypothesis” in Llull’s Figure X on p. 82 of this study and in a footnote adverts the reader to Llull’s 
use of a method involving demonstratio per hypothesim, a method which, in my view, would seem to sug-
gest that, for Llull, the terms of this opposition were not incommensurable. Cf. also Rubio (1997, 92-101); 
and Ruiz Simon (1999, 217, n. 234).
139  Demonstratio per aequiparantiam was a technique of demonstration to which Llull devoted an 
entire work, the Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam (March 1305), a technique based on the 
equivalence of the divine Dignities and felt by Llull to be superior to the two traditional scholastic methods 
of proof, namely, demonstratio propter quid (from cause to effect) and demonstratio quia (from effect to 
cause), the latter of which was considered to be the weakest form of proof. The technique under the above 
name first came to prominence in Llull’s Ars demonstrativa (ca. 1283; hereafter AD), though for its earlier 
use in his oeuvre and its possible connections to a category of relatives identified by Peter of Spain, cf. 
Bonner (2007, 66, n. 83).
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rein we find expressed, in the context of a distinction between scientia and 
sapientia, the notion of a verbum mentis, namely, a source for the idea of the 
pre-linguistic concepts of “internal discourse”. In this Book, Augustine clearly 
states (in translation) that: “[f]or although there were no words spoken, at any 
rate, he who thinks speaks in his heart”, and “[f]or the thought which is for-
med by the thing which we know, is the word which we speak in the heart”.140 
We also note Augustine’s combining of both his visual and his verbal models 
of thought or “internal discourse” in another section of the same chapter, whe-
rein he makes a direct equation within the human spiritual soul between not 
only vision and speech, but also vision and hearing.141 All three references are 
compatible with Llull’s positioning of cogitatio among the spiritual senses.
The manner in which Llull responds to the semantic triangle and to the three 
types of speech is complex, however. Llull engages primarily with what he per-
ceives to be the fundamental misunderstanding on the part of his interlocutors, 
namely, those he aims to proselytise, at all three semantic levels—conceptual, 
linguistic and real—of the articles of the Christian faith. Llull seeks to disse-
minate his arguments and the truths they not only convey and signify, but also 
demonstrate, among both Christians and non-Christians within the bounds of 
Christendom, but also among non-believers in distant lands.
For Llull, therefore, the “semantic triangle” generates a problematic which 
extends to the diversity of languages after Babel, a problem he specifically 
seeks to resolve via the formation of language schools designed to train future 
missionaries educated in his own Art to speak what he calls “Eastern lan-
guages”, to which his desire that Latin should come to occupy the place of a 
universal lingua franca acts as a complement or even serves to supplant. The 
third complexity consists in the ontological, theological and gnoseological 
status of internal thoughts, viz. “mental speech”, the spoken word and the 
written text and their relative priority in the pursuit of transmitting the truths 
of the Christian faith, refuting falsehoods and fostering adherence to man’s 
140  Augustine (1997a, 464), De trinitate, XV, 10, 17; and PL 42: 1069-1070, here 1070: “Nam etsi 
verba non sonent, in corde suo dicit utique qui cogitat”; and Augustine (1997a, 468), ibid., XV, 10, 19; and 
PL 42: 1071: “Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus.”
141  Augustine (1997a, 468), ibid., XV, 10, 18; and PL 42: 1070-1071, here 1070: “Nec tamen quia 
dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes, ideo non sunt etiam visiones exortae de notitiae visionibus, 
quando verae sunt. Foris enim cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio: intus autem cum 
cogitamus, utrumque unum est. Sicut auditio et visio duo quaedam sunt inter se distantia in sensibus cor-
poris, in animo autem non est aliud atque aliud videre et audire: ac per hoc cum locutio foris non videatur, 
sed potius audiatur, locutiones tamen interiores, hoc est, cogitationes visas dixit a Domino sanctum Evan-
gelium, non auditas.”
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“first intention”. The fourth complexity, on the other hand, which has a partial 
overlap with the third such, consists in a range of cognitive, psychological and 
gnoseological concerns relating to the human intellective soul and its interac-
tion with the interoceptive senses and the imagination. This last complexity, 
moreover, also concerns that very soul’s involvement in the expression of 
thoughts and desires, viz. mental states, theological and catechetical contents 
and universal and particular truths, all viewed within an ethical and moral con-
text, through the operations of Llull’s newly christened sixth sense, namely, 
affatus or oral communication.
2.3. The Llibre dels àngels and the Liber de locutione angelorum
In today’s terms, Llull’s perhaps most arcane treatment of “internal dis-
course” occurs in Distinction IV of a short work written most probably during 
the same period in which he composed Blaquerna, namely, the Llibre dels 
àngels (1276-1283 ?). This particular Distinction, the fourth of six, treats of 
the speech of angels both within and between themselves, as well as with 
human persons.
Equally arcane, if we accept such a judgement, is his much later work, the 
Liber de locutione angelorum, composed in Montpellier in May 1312. This 
latter work directed against the “Latin Averroists”, seeks to replace what its 
author calls “positive knowledge”, based on faith, with scientia causativa, 
itself based on reason, such scientia causativa closely resembling the knowl-
edge, free from sensory or imaginative elements, possessed by angels. One of 
the chief aims of the Liber de locutione angelorum is, in fact, to combat the 
Peripatetic axiom according to which nihil in intellectu quod non fuerit prius 
in sensu (“Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the senses”), 
namely, the argument in favour of knowledge as abstraction from sensible 
objects, on the grounds that angels have innate knowledge of God above and 
beyond the senses and the imagination and that their conceptum mentis or 
thought (a term strongly recalling Anselm’s conceptio mentis, mentioned ear-
lier) is to be equated with their speech.142
As the earlier work shows, angelic knowledge with respect to God, at least, 
142  Carles Llinàs i Puente devotes a chapter to angelic speech in his comprehensive study of the role 
of angels in Llull’s thought, though for the purposes of his book concentrates exclusively upon the latter’s 
Liber de locutione angelorum, to the detriment, I feel, of the Llibre dels àngels, which, as the more seminal 
text, cannot be so easily overlooked; cf. Llinàs i Puente (2000, 333-348).
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is produced in and by the well-ordered operation of the powers of the angelic 
intellective soul in its contemplation of its Creator, being thus supervenient 
upon angelic “internal discourse”, which itself provides a pre-eminent model 
for the kind of rational, demonstrative knowledge Llull seeks to achieve in his 
Art in the case of human beings.143
Llull gives a retrospectively self-referential and metaphysical description 
of that in which a good angel’s mental speech consists, namely, that it “follows 
the order of its essence and the nature of its being and its power as regards pro-
perties and conditions, receiving an influence from the divine Dignities”,144 all 
the terms of which he has already defined in either the Prologue or Distinction 
II.145 A good angel’s mental speech, therefore, consists in the “well-ordered 
disposition” of the acts of the powers pertaining to an angelic soul with res-
pect to the concordance God’s justice requires of those same powers by virtue 
of the divine Dignities, while a wicked angel’s mental speech, on the other 
hand, consists in the contrary of all the foregoing.146
We now turn to angelic speech or discourse proper. Llull discusses this 
topic under three main headings: first, the “internal discourse” of angels;147 
second, the discourse of angels among themselves;148 and, third, the discourse 
angels maintain with people.149 Under the second heading he discusses both 
the discourse which good angels maintain with each other and that which 
wicked angels maintain likewise. Under the third heading he distinguishes 
the speech of angels to the righteous; that of angels to the unrighteous; that of 
devils to the righteous; and that of devils to the unrighteous, thus covering all 
logical possibilities.
Llull first specifies that the purpose of angelic inter-communication be-
tween good angels is so that an angel may be known and loved by another in 
respect of what it loves regarding God and His works by means of its proper-
ties.150 In doing so, Llull indicates that he is not only discussing the nature but 
143  ORL XXI, 354ff.
144  Ibid., 354-355: “segueix l orde de sa essència e la natura de sa entitat e de sa virtut en propietats, 
condicions, reebent influència de les divines dignitats”.
145  Ibid., 307-09; 318-342.
146  Ibid., 355.
147  Ibid., 354-355.
148  Ibid., 355-359.
149  Ibid., 359-365.
150  Ibid., 356-357.
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also the function of angelic speech, the very need for which was not always 
accepted by medieval theologians.151 He also explains that angels which are 
closer to divine majesty can communicate their intellect, will and concordance 
to angels which are not so close thereto.152 Llull emphasises here the greater 
ease of understanding between angels, which are purely intellectual beings, 
than is the case in man between sensible speech and the intellect.153
In discussing the communication between good angels and righteous men, 
Llull alludes to the disputed question of whether angels require a medium of 
communication.154 His treatment of this matter begins with a negative analogy 
between human understanding which, through the medium of the intellect, 
understands perceptible words (paraules sensuals), and the understanding of 
angels which:
without any medium, though with God’s grace, understands and receives the 
perceptible things and the words which people say, with which people angels 
speak according to what they understand by the former’s words, by communi-
cating with them and participating in the greatness of their goodness, power and 
so on.155
What Llull shows here is that, unlike people, in whom communication 
occurs with the aid of the imagination and intellect acting upon perceptible 
words, it is at the level of the goodness, power, etc., in which both angels and 
people participate, that their communication occurs.
The first three Distinctions of Llull’s later De locutione angelorum, howev-
er, exemplify angelic internal discourse as conducted between the Archangels 
Michael and Gabriel, conducted, that is, in accordance with certain of the 
features of Llull’s AGU of 1305-1308.156 In Distinction IV of this short work 
Llull treats the mental and vocal speech angels perform with people. Llull here 
contends with respect to angelic mental discourse with humans, however, that 
people who understand the truth in the two angels’ syllogisms are in commu-
151  Ibid., 356.
152  Id.
153  Id.
154  For discussion of this point, cf. above § 2.1.
155  Ibid., 360: “sens tot miyià, enperò ab gràcia de Déu, entén e pren les coses sensuals e les paraules 
que ls hòmens dien, ab los quals hòmens parlen los àngels segons so que entenen per lurs paraules, comu-
nicantsse ab aquels, participants la granea de lur bonea, poder e cètera”.
156  ROL XVI, 217-231.
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nication with good angels, while those who fail to do so (such as Latin Aver-
roists and “Saracens”) are in communication with wicked angels or demons.157
He thus equates the understanding and loving of true syllogisms by virtu-
ous humans with acts of internal discourse likewise addressed to good angels. 
We can conclude from the above, therefore, that one of the (primary) functions 
of human internal discourse is none other than discourse with good angels, 
who induce virtues in worthy people, while their wicked counterparts induce 
vices in wicked people.158 In fact, in his Llibre dels àngels, written some thirty 
years earlier, Llull had gone so far as to express the complete coincidence 
between the mental discourse of the unrighteous and the very words of de-
mons, the speech of the latter being “specified by means of [a person’s] mental 
speech in the acts of [the soul’s] powers”.159
It is clear from the Llibre dels àngels, at the very least, that Llull draws 
upon and combines suggestive elements from the writings of St Augustine 
regarding pre-linguistic speech and the powers of the soul in order to formu-
late his theory of “internal discourse” with respect to angels, a theory wherein 
there is precisely communication at a pre-linguistic level between the intellec-
tive powers of the angelical soul, this being a model which Llull also proposes 
for the highest levels of human “internal discourse”, namely, consideration, 
cogitation, prayer and contemplation.
3. Ramon Llull and the Greek tradition
3.1. Logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos
Claude Panaccio has traced the origins of the notion of thought as a kind 
of “internal discourse” from a brief passage in Plato’s Timaeus, 37b, a passage 
which associates such discourse (logos) with a form of non-articulated sound-
less and internal utterance, and which one recent translation renders as being 
“borne along without utterance or sound within the self-moved thing”.160 This 
work had been partially translated into Latin during the fourth century CE 
by Calcidius and was also the subject of a commentary by the fifth-century 
Neoplatonist Proclus (of which latter the poem in Book III of Boethius’s De 
consolatione philosophiae provided a summary), and thus would have been 
157  Ibid., 231-236.
158  Ibid., 236.
159  ORL XXI, 364: “especificades ab les paraules de sa pensa en los actus de les potencies”.
160  Cf. Plato (2000, 1224-1291, here 1241).
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known to medieval thinkers.161 In Panaccio’s view, however, for Plato, thought 
remains bound up with its articulation within a particular language, even if 
uttered internally in silence.
Passing over many of the details of Panaccio’s account, by the time 
St John of Damascus (ca. 675-749 CE), there had already formed an accep-
ted distinction among schools of Greek philosophy between logos prophorikos 
(“the uttered word”) and logos endiathetos (“the word remaining within”).162 In 
its twelfth-century translation by Burgundio of Pisa, John of Damascus’s De 
fide orthodoxa, became the most direct historical connection between the Greek 
notion of logos endiathetos and the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholas-
tics.163 This text transmits, via Maximus the Confessor’s Ad presbyterum Mari-
num,164 a theory of the five movements of the mind first found in St Irenaeus of 
Lyon’s Adversus haereses.165 It is worth pausing to enumerate these:
1) the first movement of the mind in relation to a given object is called 
ennoia or “thought”;166
2) when this movement persists, intensifies and takes hold of the en-
tire soul, it is called enthumēsis or “consideration”;167
3) when such consideration lingers on the same object and is, as it 
were, put to the test, it is given the name phronēsis or “reflection”;168
161  Panaccio (1999, 30).
162  For the parallel distinction found in the writings of both John of Damascus and al-Farabi between 
an innermost light of the mind and the specific intellectual products thereby illuminated, namely, reflec-
tions, deliberations and meditations, see Panaccio (1999, 82). Of particular relevance to Llull’s case is the 
fact that al-Farabi identifies a term (al-nutq), which corresponds to logos endiathetos, as well as a rational 
faculty itself or “light of the mind” whereby one may distinguish good from evil and acquire concepts, not 
to mention the sciences and the arts, cf. id.
163  Ibid., 79.
164  Maximus the Confessor (1865, 580-662).
165  Panaccio (1999, 85).
166  The translators of Ammonius’s commentary on the Peri hermeneias translate this term as follows: 
notitia (Moerbeke); cognitio (Anonymus); notio (Sylvanius, Rasarius); while Themistius’s De anima ren-
ders it as: conceptio, conceptus and intellectus; cf. Ammonius (1961, lxxxii). Other senses associated with 
this term include: intentio, meditatio, mens, ratio, sensus and sententia; cf. ibid., 507. That there is overlap 
between the Latin senses of meditatio and cogitatio can be seen in the fact that the former is a rendering of 
both ennoia and epinoia, the latter of both dianoia and epinoia; cf. ibid., 483 and 494.
167  The term enthumēsis can be rendered in Latin as consideratio.
168  The term phronēsis can be rendered in Latin as prudentia; cf. ibid., 514.
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4) when such reflection extends its range, it becomes boulē (?) or “de-
liberation”;169
5) when this deliberation grows and spreads out further, it is called di-
alogismos or “reasoning”, which is equally and justifiably called 
logos endiathetos or “internal discourse”, from which springs logos 
prophorikos or externally uttered speech.170
John of Damascus’s own classification differs slightly from the above. 
Panaccio notes, however, that the Latin translation of this text (cited in the 
previous note) has, following on from the fourth movement of deliberation 
or consilium, a spreading out of this latter into a “discursive plurality”, which 
it calls cogitatio, and which corresponds to the “internal discourse” of logos 
endiathetos, that is to say, a pre-linguistic intellectual discursivity or “mental 
speech”.171
We know with some certainty, however, that Llull would not have had 
access to the De fide orthodoxa or the works of Boethius until at least his 
first visit to Montpellier in 1275, and, more probably, during the period of 
his residence there between 1278 and 1283, when he composed the AD and 
Blaquerna in that city.172
169  The term boulē can be rendered in Latin as consilium, i.e. ‘counsel’; cf. ibid., 506; cf. also follow-
ing note.
170  Irenaeus of Lyon (1857, 0742C-0743A): “Prima enim motio ejus de aliquo, ennoia appellatur; per-
severans autem et aucta, et universam apprehendens animam, enthymesis vocatur. Haec autem enthymesis 
multum temporis faciens in eodem, et velut probata, sensatio nominatur. Haec autem sensatio in multum 
dilatata, consilium facta est; augmentum autem et motus in multum dilatatus consilii, cogitationis examina-
tio: quae etiam in mente perseverans, verbum rectissime appellabitur; ex quo emissibilis emittitur verbum” 
(emphasis added); cf. Panaccio (1999, 85). The passage in which this classification arises has been translat-
ed into English as follows: “The first movement of mind in relation to some objects is called ‘notion’. When 
this continues, strengthens, and possesses the entire soul, it is called ‘comprehensive thinking’. In turn, this, 
when it spends much time on the same object and is so to speak tested, becomes ‘acceptance’. This accep-
tance greatly amplified becomes ‘deliberation’. When this deliberation grows and is amplified it becomes 
‘internal discourse’, from which comes the uttered word”, in Grant (1997, 81), here slightly amended. It is 
worth noting the discrepancies of terminology between the above translation and that provided (in French) 
in Panaccio (1999, 85), as stated above. For a different English translation of this passage, cf. Irenaeus of 
Lyon (1867/2001, 970 and note).
171  Panaccio (1999, 90). In the opening chapter of Llull’s Blaquerna, we find Evast deliberating upon 
his choice of the order of matrimony (see Blaquerna, ch. 1, § 4).
172  For his AD, cf. OS I, 273-521; ROL XXXII.
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3.2. The Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna
With reference now to the latter work, composed between 1276-1283, 
I believe that it is possible to maintain that Ramon Llull specifically endorsed 
something very akin to the logos endiathetos/prophorikos distinction. In this 
work, “cogitation” forms one of a group of terms which require consideration 
apart: namely, those relating to varieties or levels of thought. The terms in 
question are the following: pensar/pensament (lit. “to think”/“thought”); con-
siderar/consideració (lit. “to consider”/“consideration”); deliberar/delibera-
ció (lit. “to deliberate”/“deliberation”); and cogitar/cogitació (lit. “to cogita-
te”/“cogitation” or “to reflect upon”/“reflection”).
These five verb-noun pairings are used, it would seem, in a systematic and 
ascending way by Llull. I believe Llull’s deliberate use of such terms, however, 
is key to understanding his approach to the various levels of thought and the res-
pective approximations thereof to that of “internal discourse” (Lat. cogitatio). 
We should note, however, that in the final part of his Oracions de Ramon from 
1290, entitled “On the Doctrine of Loving God”, Llull makes it abundantly clear 
that the thought, consideration and cogitation which he calls upon his readers to 
exercise in respect of the preceding units of his text, are themselves subordinate 
to the overall aim of increasing that reader’s love for God.173
A very early work by Llull, the Oracions e contemplacions del intellect 
(1274-1276 ?), is also crucial for an understanding of Llull’s overall intellec-
tual project insofar as he explicitly asserts therein the insufficiency of his first 
Art, the Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, dating from around 1274, in 
respect of lofty matters of contemplation.174 So, if prayer and contemplation, 
that is, the objects of human “internal discourse”, are themselves superior to 
Llull’s Art, angelic “internal discourse” itself must be all the more so. Llull, 
nevertheless, expresses frustration concerning the limits of human cogitation 
in Chapter 168 of LC, wherein is manifested his desire in prayer for a broade-
ning and extension of the limits of human thought, for the sake of fuller con-
templation of God.175 Perhaps he went on to seek this desideratum under the 
173  ORL XVIII, 378-379.
174  ORL XVIII, 249: “Aprés que l enteniment hac contemplat segons que demunt es dit, sentí en sí que 
no s tenia per content de ço que tant solament hac considerat e descorregut en la Art que havia abreuyada 
de trobar veritat, e per virtut de Deu, esforçà s a puyar entendre molt altament, dient al voler e al membrar 
de ses sors, estes paraules per metàfora.”
175  ORL IV, 416: “Lo vostre servidor, Sènyer Deus, vos prega e us adora e us clama mercè de totes ses 
forces, que vos a la sua contemplacio examplets e estenats ses termenacions, per tal que per l examplament 
d aquelles cresca e multiplic sa gloria e sa vertut, contemplant en vos, esperant de vos gloria e benediccio.”
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influence of his thoughts on internal human and angelic “internal discourse”, 
and the application of these to prayer and contemplation, in the structures and 
alphabet of his progressive Arts, here only faintly anticipated.
We should also note in passing that Llull’s use of the term cogitation, na-
mely, the highest level of thought, is completely “democratic”, given that in 
Chapter 66 of Blaquerna such a level is seen to be fully within the reach of 
even rural shepherds.176 Equally worthy of note is the fact that, in his Vita co-
aetanea, dictated towards the very end of his life in 1311, Llull recollects and 
construes his formative “conversion experience” prior to the composition of 
any of his works, a “conversion” brought about by repeated nocturnal visions 
of the crucified Christ, in terms of his “secum tota illa nocte cogitando trac-
tans”, that is to say, of his—in this instance, pained—“internal discourse”.177
4. Conclusion
In the most general terms possible, then, I think it is possible to chart an 
evolution in Ramon Llull’s thought on the issue of “internal discourse” du-
ring the period between 1271/1272 and 1290. I would like to suggest that 
from 1271/1272 itself to 1278 Llull endorses a more Stoic, Aristotelian and 
Augustinian “theory of signs” (or semiotics), though one already combined 
with Neoplatonic elements (such as the belief in the causal and natural priority 
of mental over spoken speech), a theory in which, strictly speaking, spoken 
words signify thoughts alone (or in the Stoics view a lekton or “sayable”) and 
thought itself is to be considered pre-linguistic.178 Following his first stay in 
Montpellier, that is to say, between 1278-1283, however, I believe that there 
are signs of an increasing influence of Boethian, Anselmian, Victorine and 
Damascene elements amounting to a “theory of signification” (or semantics). 
In this latter theory, such words, again strictly speaking, signify thoughts prin-
cipally and things secondarily, insofar as words, for Boethius, at least, signify 
things through the medium of thought, where that thought functions as a mir-
ror wherein similtudines or likenesses of things are reflected and it is those 
likenesses as signified rather than the external things themselves which are 
apprehended by the rational soul, albeit that those external things feature as 
the content of thoughts. Here Boethius is, of course, relying upon Aristotle’s 
176  NEORL VIII, 303-304; (English version) Llull (2016, 293).
177  Llull (2010, 32).
178  The Latin rendering of to lekton is locutio, for which, in the context of St Anselm’s and St Augus-
tine’s writings, cf. above, §§ 1; 2; 2.2, and n. 140; cf. also Ammonius (1961, 53, 494).
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definition of “spoken sounds” as “symbols of affections in the soul”, these “af-
fections”, unlike the “spoken sounds” and the “written marks” by which these 
sounds are symbolised, being, in Aristotle’s words, as previously mentio ned, 
“the same for all”, as are the “actual things” of which such “affections” are 
likenesses. It is at this stage, I believe, that we see the first intimations of a 
more linguistic construal of thought on Llull’s part.
Such “affections in the soul” are generally held to denote thoughts and as 
such are passive, at least as considered in the Peri hermeneias, though Aristo-
tle’s De anima also speaks of the possibility of the consideration of thought (or 
nous) both in active and in passive terms.179 What we find, in Llull, in fact, is 
that not only the Godhead, but also the entirety of creation, thought included, 
is, in the more mature stages of his thought, suffused with active, passive and 
conjunctive elements, which he calls “correlatives”, and that, possibly taking 
Aristotle’s account in De anima to heart, this applies equally to “thought”.
A third stage in Llull’s thought is represented by the period 1287-1289, 
wherein Llull may have fully assimilated influences from Alexander of Hales, 
Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas and Proclus. But whereas Boethius 
may have only had indirect access to the writings of Proclus, it has been es-
tablished that Llull, via the corpus Dionysiacum he consulted during his stay 
in Paris between 1287-1289, would have been familiar with Proclus’s thought 
and would have been able to supplement Boethius and his own possible rea-
ding of Boethius’s Commentarii with the Procline notion, expressed in the lat-
ter’s In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, that names are first and foremost 
likenesses of Platonic Forms, that is to say, of Ideas, and only secondarily of 
perceptible things.180 It is Llull’s supplementation of Boethius’s commentari-
es upon Aristotle’s De interpretatione with his readings in the works of the 
above-mentioned writers, I believe, which serve as one of the foundations 
for Llull’s dramatic shift in cosmology in the period leading up to 1290, the 
179  Aristotle (1995a, 684), De anima, III, 5, 430a14-17: “[...] thought, as we have described it, is what 
it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: 
this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours”; 
“[...] existit unus  intellectus, qui correspondet [...] quia fit omnia, et alter [qui fiat] omnia, [estque] species 
quaedem habitus simili modo, quo lumen; nam etiam lumen vero quodam sensu efficit, ut colores, qui in 
potentia sunt, actu existant”, in Aristotle (1957, 255; here slightly amended).
180  Proclus (1987, 220), English translation; In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, IV, Commentary, 
851, ll. 7-9: “[...] if names are images in words of the objects to which they apply, they refer primarily to 
immaterial Forms, and derivatively to sensible things [...]”.
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time at which his Art was thoroughly recast, and the very changes such a shift 
necessitated in his Art.
I trust that I have not given the impression of believing that, by stressing 
the natural and causal priority of thought and its active role in establishing the 
conditions of possibility for communication, if not in constituting the very 
medium wherein and whereby the transmission of concepts or passiones ani-
mae concerning things, both internal and external, are articulated in external 
discourse, Ramon Llull is advocating any kind of telepathic understanding of 
communication. Rather, I hope to have suggested that, by means of his increa-
sing familiarity with tradition, during the years 1271/1272-1289, at the latest, 
Llull was able to fashion a coherent and innovative response to that tradition, 
while examining the question of whether “internal discourse” was indeed fun-
damentally pre-linguistic, not to mention, non-vocal.
Precedents for the belief that such was the case can easily be found in 
Augustine’s De Trinitate, Book XV, while precedents for the fact that such 
was the case can easily be found in Aristotle’s logical works. If these logical 
structures could precede language, then so could the equally logical structures 
of Ramon Llull’s early system of thought as employed in their principal appli-
cation to the practices of prayer and contemplation and the latter’s subsequent 
written exposition. Rather than advocating a form of telepathy, then, what 
Llull seems to be doing is encouraging the readers of his written word (and the 
audiences to his spoken utterances) to pass beyond the realms of that written 
or spoken word in order to arrive at that of intellectual thought.
Reading the works of Ramon Llull is reading the written, printed or elec-
tronic marks of his own “internal discourse”. Whether this discourse be ad-
dressed to God, so often apostrophised and contemplated in his earlier works, 
to Christ, to the Mother of God, to the angels, saints, confessors or Fathers of 
the Church, invoked in prayer as these are, to his son, as is the case with one 
work, to his sources or to his readership, it is united by the growing belief that, 
if a concept can function as a sign, then thought itself may be possessed of its 
own ordinatio ad alterum.
Finally, a few comments should be made regarding Gadamer’s analysis as 
mentioned at the start of this article. First, Gadamer’s counter-Enlightenment 
and comparative interpretation of the relation of logos and verbum is ahisto-
rical, at least from the viewpoint of texts produced during the Middle Ages, 
for the simple reason of the virtual absence of the Platonic corpus itself from 
the purview of medieval writers. Elements of Platonic thought, as we know, 
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of course, were transmitted indirectly to the protagonists of High Scholas-
ticism, not least through the Neoplatonic tradition (e.g. Plotinus, Porphyry, 
Iambilichus, Proclus, the Pseudo-Dionysius), though in Ramon Llull’s case 
his familiarity with the two latter authors would not occur until 1287-1289, 
i.e. the end of the period studied in this article. Second, Gadamer’s equation 
of intellectus with the term “reason” is inappropriately applied to the Middle 
Ages, insofar as it is anachronistic. Third, his equation (or that of his transla-
tors’) of cogitatio with mere ‘thoughtfulness’ constitutes, in a medieval con-
text, a desacralisation of a term more closely associated with meditation and, 
thus, prayer. And finally, the schematism of his account is incompatible with 
the referential complexity and specificity of the texts produced by scholastic 
writers, not least by Ramon Llull himself, who draws upon a wide range of 
sources and reconfigures these and accommodates them to one another in a 
way which suits his own particular—contemplative, epistemological and pro-
selytising—purposes. 
Having said this, however, Gadamer’s hermeneutics does offer the possi-
bility of viewing St Augustine’s novel perspective on the relations between 
verbum cordis and language (i.e. thought and speech) as a paradoxical ‘advan-
ce’ with respect to the reversionary step made by Aristotelian-Scholasticism 
vis-à-vis the latter’s return to the classical concept of logos and the consequent 
reduction of language to a system of signs (i.e. a semiotics). On this reading, 
therefore, Llull’s writings on “internal discourse” themselves, having drawn 
deeply from the well of Augustinianism, would represent a reprise of this no-
vel approach, considered from the viewpoint of the modern philosophy of 
language.181 I hope to have made clear in this article that the texts and contexts 
in and from which Llull conveys his thoughts on such matters are even richer 
and more complex than the Gadamerian analysis would allow.
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